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Abstract
Three essays in corporate investment decisions
by
Zheng Wang
In this dissertation, I use data from publicly listed companies to explore factors that
affect corporate investment decisions. In Chapter 1, I investigate the sensitive of invest-
ment to cash flow. I argue that the sensitivity is partly driven by agency-conflict within
stockholders, namely, controlling shareholders extracting firms’ resources at the expenses
of minority shareholders. To test this finding, I use the mandatory Split-Share Structure
Reform in China, which exogenously converted all non-tradable shares to tradable, and
reduced the incentives of controlling shareholders’ expropriation by better aligning the
interests of all shareholders. By employing a theoretical model and conducting empirical
analysis, I find a significant reduction in the sensitivity for firms with higher levels of
pre-reform expropriation, and the effect is more pronounced for private firms. Moreover,
I find that manager’s over-investment, financial constraints, and measurement errors in
investment opportunities do not drive the reduction in sensitivity. Overall, my findings
support the view that controlling shareholders’ expropriation leads to investment-cash
flow sensitivity. Given that controlling shareholders’ expropriation is widely prevalent,
my findings have broad relevance for explaining investment and financing decisions.
Chapter 2 examines whether investment-cash flow sensitivity is a good measure of fi-
nancial constraints in emerging markets. We exploit a staggered industrial regulation in
China as a natural experiment to identify the impact of increasing financial constraints on
the sensitivity. We find that the investment-cash flow sensitivity becomes significantly
vii
larger by 7.6% after the enactment of regulation policy in treated industries using a
difference-in-differences methodology. Consistent with political favoritism explanations,
we show that such a positive association is stronger for state-owned enterprises and more
bank-dependent firms, but is smaller under credit easing. The findings empirically sug-
gest that investment-cash flow sensitivity indeed measures financial constraint.
In Chapter 3, I investigate the causality between government intervention and in-
vestment efficiency. I use the staggered industrial regulation in Chapter 2 as a pol-
icy instrument to changes in government intervention. With a difference-in-differences
methodology, I find that investment efficiency becomes significantly larger after the en-
actment in treated industries. Moreover, I show that the association between higher
investment efficiency, measured as increasing investment-Tobin’s Q sensitivity, and de-
creasing government intervention is stronger for state-owned enterprises. In addition, I
argue that for private firms, such association is significantly stronger for those with polit-
ical connections. My findings empirically suggest that government intervention distorts
the efficiency of corporate investment.
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Chapter 1
Controlling Shareholders’
Expropriation and the Sensitivity of
Investment to Cash Flow
1.1 Introduction
The relation between investment and financing decisions is one of the most essential
and widely explored issues in corporate finance. In a perfect capital market, invest-
ment would rely on a firm’s investment opportunities alone rather than on its financing
structure (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). However, empirical findings from the literature
exhibit a significant and positive correlation between investment and cash flow even after
controlling for investment opportunities.1 Two capital market imperfections have been
proposed to explain investment-cash flow (ICF) sensitivity, namely, financial constraints
and manager’s over-investment. On one hand, investment relies more on cash flow be-
cause external finance is not always available if firms are financially constrained, thereby
leading to ICF sensitivity.2 On the other hand, as Jensen (1986) notes, the agency costs
1For instance, Lewellen and Lewellen, 2016 study U.S. firms from 1971-2009 and find that an addi-
tional dollar of cash flow in the current year leads to nearly $0.35 of investment in fixed assets after
correcting for measurement errors in investment opportunities.
2Fazzari et al. (1988) first note that ICF sensitivity reflects financial constraints. However, Kaplan
and Zingales (1997) find that less constrained firms exhibit a higher ICF sensitivity. Whether ICF
sensitivity serves as a good indicator for financial constraints remains a controversial subject.
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of free cash flow mainly affect the sensitivity through the canonical principle-agent prob-
lem, that is, managers favor growth over profitability because they can obtain private
benefits from control, which causes overspending and results in greater ICF sensitivity.
This paper proposes a simple theoretical model and tests a new type of agency-conflict
that yields ICF sensitivity without appealing to manager’s over-investment. I argue that
controlling shareholders (i.e., parent companies) expropriate minority shareholders, which
leads to ICF sensitivity. Theoretically, I extend the framework of Kaplan and Zingales
(1997) by considering costly financing and agency-conflict with shareholders. I predict
that ICF sensitivity increases as the controlling shareholders divert more resources from
the firm and decreases as the shareholder protection is strengthened. Expropriation di-
minishes investment returns, thereby increasing the cost of external finance relative to
cash flow. Thus, firms have to rely more on the low-cost cash flow for investment due to
a comparatively larger cost-wedge between external and internal funds.
I test the theory using an exogenous variation in the incentives of controlling share-
holders’ expropriation. I exploit a natural experiment in China, the Split-Share Structure
Reform (SSSR), as my identification strategy. Before 2005, almost all publicly listed com-
panies in China included both tradable shares (TS) and non-tradable shares (NTS). On
average, the NTS, which consist of 2/3 of total shares, were not tradable in the stock
market. Under the split-share scheme, the wealth of NTS (TS) holders was determined
by the book value (market value). The agency-conflict within shareholders was acute
because the controlling shareholders (i.e., holders of NTS) would divert more resources
from firms without being punished by declines in market value. The mandatory reform
in 2005 converted all NTS to TS and exogenously reduced controlling shareholders’ ex-
propriation because the SSSR removed significant market frictions and better aligned the
interests of all stockholders (Chen et al., 2012; Liao et al., 2014).
I use an unbalanced panel of 1,314 listed firms in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen
2
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Stock Exchange Markets from 1998 to 2014. With financial data from China Stock Mar-
ket & Accounting Research (CSMAR), I analyze the changes in ICF sensitivity after the
SSSR announcement. I find that ICF sensitivity has decreased significantly after the
reform. Furthermore, I use two common proxies for expropriation to measure the impact
of the SSSR on ICF sensitivity, namely, the divergence of controlling shareholders’ own-
ership and control rights (excess control) and the amount of related party transactions
(RPTs) between the parent company and the listed company. Higher excess control and
more RPTs indicate more severe controlling shareholders’ expropriation. By applying
a difference-in-differences approach, I find economically and statistically significant de-
clines in ICF sensitivity for firms classified as high expropriation during the pre-reform
period. The findings are robust to the controls for operating and financing determinants
of investment as well as to the controls for unobserved firm, year and (one-digit) industry
by year fixed effects. My findings validate the key predictions from my model and suggest
a causal link between controlling shareholders’ expropriation and ICF sensitivity.
I also examine whether the changes in ICF sensitivity differ between state-owned en-
terprises (SOEs) and private firms because state ownership is an important characteristic
in China. The corporate insiders’ ability of expropriation is more constrained in SOEs
than in private firms because the controlling shareholder of SOEs is a government agency,
which is an organization with internal control systems (Chen et al., 2012). In addition,
SOEs have non-profit considerations, such as meeting certain political and social welfare
purposes (Shleifer, 1998). Thus, the incentive and opportunity for the controlling share-
holder of SOEs to divert resources for private benefits are less prevalent.3 By contrast,
expropriation is stronger in private firms than in SOEs because the largest shareholder is
usually a person or a family, that pursues maximization of returns, including private re-
3Although the majority of shares are tradable after the SSSR, the SOEs did not sell a large proportion
of state-owned shares, suggesting that the state still remains dominant in these firms.
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turns by expropriating other minority shareholders. Moreover, the fact that management
in private firms is usually under the controlling shareholder can facilitate expropriation
(La Porta et al., 1999; Johnson et al., 2000). Consistent with this view, I find that pri-
vate firms mainly drive the declines in ICF sensitivity even though they only account
for 30% of the total observations. Furthermore, previous studies restrict their sample to
manufacturing firms only. I do so to be consistent with previous studies and find more
pronounced sensitivity reduction, especially in private firms.
I conduct a battery of ancillary tests to verify the robustness of my findings and
rule out alternative explanations. My empirical approach assumes that the SSSR is an
exogenous shock to controlling shareholders’ expropriation rather than to cash flow or
investment opportunities that are uncorrelated with agency-conflict yet affect ICF sensi-
tivity. In the robustness check, I validate these assumptions by showing that my findings
are not subject to endogenous control problems. Furthermore, my findings are robust
to different sample time selections and to an alternative measure of expropriation, the
monitoring intensity from other large (non-controlling) shareholders. More importantly,
I thoroughly investigate alternative explanations that may contribute to the significant
declines in ICF sensitivity for high expropriation firms, such as, mitigating managers’
over-investment, easing financial constraints, and reducing measurement errors in invest-
ment opportunities. Although the SSSR may affect all three channels, the effects remain
similar in magnitude and the difference is statistically insignificant for firms with high or
low controlling shareholders’ expropriation.
This paper adds to research on agency costs and ICF sensitivity. Jensen (1986) illus-
trates agency-induced ICF sensitivity and Stulz (1990) provides a theoretical model for
this mechanism. Thereafter, many empirical studies have examined the free cash flow
hypothesis and its implication on ICF sensitivity (see e.g., Lang et al., 1991; Lamont,
1997; Richardson, 2006; Lewellen and Lewellen, 2016). However, only few studies have
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focused on ICF sensitivity and agency costs within stockholders, even though controlling
shareholders’ expropriation is one of the most important issues in corporate governance.
One exception is Lins et al. (2005), who argue that the cost of external financing can be
much higher for firms with more severe expropriation. Given that outside investors ex-
pect their wealth to be expropriated by the controlling shareholders and thus request for
a higher risk premium, the firm increases their dependence on cash flow for investment.
Moreover, my work extends the theoretical model in Kaplan and Zingales (1997) to ex-
ploit the connection among expropriation, corporate governance, and ICF sensitivity.
My paper also exploits the SSSR as an identification strategy in the context of ICF
sensitivity. A standard critique for the ICF sensitivity arises from the measurement
errors in investment opportunities, such that cash flow is simply correlated with invest-
ment opportunities (e.g., Erickson and Whited, 2000; Alti, 2003). Empirical studies have
addressed this concern by examining exogenous shocks as an identification strategy or
correcting measurement errors.4 My results address endogeneity by using the SSSR as
an identification strategy. In addition, this reform has exogenous effects because its im-
plementation is almost universal in the world’s largest transitional economy.
In addition to these advantages in identification, my research design can increase
the power of my tests. First, controlling shareholders’ expropriation is widely preva-
lent, especially in countries where firms are primarily controlled by a single dominant
shareholder, for instance, Western European countries, East Asian countries and Latin
American countries (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; La Porta et al., 1999; Lin et al., 2013).
U.S. firms exhibit relatively little ownership concentration and modest expropriation
(Claessens et al., 2002). Thus, studying non-U.S. firms can provide evidence to analyze
4Some studies exploit shocks to cash flow without changing growth opportunities and argue that
cash flow matters for investment (e.g., Lamont, 1997; Rauh, 2006). Recent studies also find the ICF
sensitivity remains robust after correcting for measurement errors in investment opportunities (Lewellen
and Lewellen, 2016; Ag˘ca and Mozumdar, 2017).
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the impact of controlling shareholders’ expropriation on ICF sensitivity. In particular,
the weak shareholder protection and restrictions on the tradability of majority shares
in China highlight the importance of detecting the exogenous variation in controlling
shareholders’ expropriation. Second, in Chinese listed firms, pre-reform ownership struc-
tures are exogenously determined during the IPO process, and the trading restrictions
on the majority shares have limited the controlling shareholders’ endogenous choice on
ownership and control rights (Chen et al., 2012). Third, China has relatively immature
capital markets, especially in bond and equity finance; thus, the investment relies more
on internally generated funds. Overall, these advantages allow the SSSR to be a unique
setting for studying the effects of controlling shareholders’ expropriation on ICF sensi-
tivity.
My results are in line with the studies that investigate ownership structures and cor-
porate value. The literature suggests that expropriation by corporate insiders engenders
corporate value discount (e.g., Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Bae et al., 2012). According
to the entrenchment effects, firm value decreases when shareholders have large excess
control rights (e.g., Claessens et al., 2002; Lemmon and Lins, 2003).5 My paper supports
this view by showing that expropriation distorts the efficient allocation of investment for
firms with excess control, thereby leading to a decrease in firm value. When investment
relies more on the availability of internal funds after controlling for investment oppor-
tunities, companies tend to forgo profitable projects. My work also complements Porta
et al. (2002), who document low valuations for firms in countries with weak shareholder
protection.
5Controlling shareholders’ expropriation is exacerbated when firm owners exercise control through
complex mechanisms, e.g. dual-class shares, pyramidal ownership structure, and cross-holdings, thereby
leading to the divergence of controlling shareholder’s cash flow and control rights (e.g., La Porta et al.,
1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Laeven and Levine, 2009; Lin et al., 2013). In such cases, the risk of the
ultimate controller diverting corporate resources for private benefits is high, because they can control
firm’s operations and conduct self-dealing transactions with very limited direct financial costs (Lin et al.,
2011).
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My findings also shed light on how regulatory policy improving corporate governance
can affect investment and financing efficiency. Such policies are common in developed
countries, such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the antitakeover laws in the U.S. This re-
form reveals the benefits of removing market frictions because resources are misallocated
due to internal working problems under the split-share structure. Although my paper
focuses on China, my findings have important implications for understanding how the
agency relationship, investment allocation, and transparency can shape firms’ financing
patterns. One essential implication from my study is that the liquidity of majority shares
can alleviate the agency-conflict within stockholders in private firms. My paper also pro-
vides guidance to policymakers who are engaged in design of corporate governance and
legal institutions in emerging markets.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces background information on the
Split-Share Structure Reform. Section 3 presents a simple theoretical framework. Section
4 describes data and provides summary statistics. Section 5 presents the main empirical
findings. Section 6 discusses alternative explanations, and Section 7 concludes the paper
with some remarks about the current SOE reform.
introduction
1.2 Institutional Background of the Split-Share Struc-
ture Reform
Before 2005, a unique context in Chinese stock market was that almost all listed
companies included both TS and NTS. The Chinese government created this two-tier
structure scheme under the context of the “planned economy” when the stock market
was first established in 1990. This is because they wanted to avoid particular problems,
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such as the privatization of SOEs and the loss of state control (Yang et al., 2015). In
addition, the government had concerns about the pressure under full circulation. With
TS only accounting for a small portion, it would be cost-efficient for the government to
retreat if the experiment of establishing stock market failed. Under this scheme, around
70% of the NTS are state-owned shares (state shares and state-owned legal person shares)
and the rest of the NTS are other legal person shares in private firms, mainly promoter
domestic legal person shares. The fraction of NTS differs for each firm, and on average,
NTS holders (usually the controlling shareholders) had roughly a two-thirds of the ma-
jority shares.6 NTS holders can only sell their shares through a negotiated price (based
on net asset value per share) with government-approved auction under special circum-
stances (Liao et al., 2014). Individual investors hold the TS, and the transaction happens
in the stock market. Thus, the tradable shareholder, usually the non-controller, has lit-
tle power to influence the decisions made by the controlling shareholder who owns the
NTS. Although both types of shares have the same cash flow rights and voting rights,
the market frictions resulting from the inability of NTS transactions in the secondary
market have made the stock market less efficient (Liao et al., 2014).
One of the most detrimental aspects of this two-tier structure is the market frictions.
The book value measures the value of the NTS, while the market value measures the TS,
thereby making it difficult to align the interests of all shareholders. To improve this sit-
uation, on Jan. 31, 2004, the State Council issued “Some Opinions of the State Council
on Promoting the Reform, Opening and Steady Growth of Capital Market” as a blueprint
to resolve the split-share structure.7 In addition, this document also lists guidelines to
6The appreciation of NTS does not depend on stock price but on a contract transfer price, which
refers to the net asset value per share, equal to the sum of par value of stocks, retained earnings, earning
surplus and capital surplus over the total number of outstanding shares. The contract transfer price is
also lower than the stock price.
7In Section 3, the State Council mentioned that “... standardize the transfer of non-floating shares
of listed companies, thus preventing loss of state-owned assets”; “... steadily solve the distribution of
non-tradable shares of listed company at present...” (StateCouncil, 2005)
8
Controlling Shareholders’ Expropriation and the Sensitivity of Investment to Cash Flow Chapter 1
provide better shareholder protection and enhance the supervision of the capital market.
In April, 2005, the Chinese government officially enacted this mandatory reform with
the purpose of eliminating the two-tier structure for both SOEs and non-SOEs. This re-
quired the full conversion of NTS into TS, subject to the agreement of NTS shareholders
to compensate TS shareholders.
The time for each firm to finish converting its shares depends on its bargaining pro-
cess. The agreement NTS holders give compensation to TS holers, in terms of cash or
stock shares, had to be approved by two-thirds of all shareholders and two-thirds of the
tradable shareholders who voted. Most firms finished converting their NTS within a 18-
month pre-specified window from the middle of 2005 to the end of 2006.8
1.3 A Simple Model
I consider a two-stage model that includes a controlling shareholder and a manager.
The timing of model is that the controlling shareholder, in this case the non-tradable
shareholder, first chooses the fraction of expropriation (α) from the firm. The manager
observes α before choosing investment to maximize the remaining profits. The control-
ling shareholder usually takes the form of RPTs to divert resources. In most countries,
the diversion is legal but usually requires costly transaction, such as setting up interme-
diary institutions or legal risk (Johnson et al., 2000). Following Porta et al. (2002), the
cost-of-theft function is expressed as c(k, α), where k denotes the quality of shareholder
protection. The better protection of tradable (minority) shareholders increases the cost
of expropriation. Formally, I maintain the following assumptions in Porta et al. (2002):
8After the completion of the reform, NTS holders experience a “lock-up” period during which they
cannot sell or transfer their shares on the stock market over the following 12 months and sell or transfer
no more than 10% of their shares cumulatively over the following 24 months (Yang et al., 2015).
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c(k, α) is increasing in k and α, strictly convex in α, and ckα > 0. The last inequality is
crucial for the sign of comparative static analysis and it implies that the marginal cost
of stealing is higher when tradable shareholders are better protected. The total return
to investment I is given by a strictly concave production function F (I). In this simple
model, the scale of investment return does not matter, as can be seen in equation (1)
below.
If the dividends are not considered, the controlling shareholder chooses α to maximize
his/her private benefits:
max
α
{αF (I)− c(k, α)F (I)} (1.1)
where the first term is the controlling shareholder’s private benefits from expropriating
investment return and the second term is the cost to do so.
Next, I assume that the manager observes the controlling shareholder’s decision on
expropriation (α), and then chooses the investment level to maximize the remaining prof-
its. This part of the model is a generalization of Kaplan and Zingales (1997) with costly
financing and agency problems within shareholders.9 The manager has limited control
over controlling shareholders’ expropriation because the weak board of shareholders in
China allows the controlling shareholder to influence the appointment of management.10
Conforming to the notations employed in Kaplan and Zingales (1997), I consider the case
where a manager chooses the profit maximizing level of investment. Investment can be
financed either with cash flow W or with external funds E (E > 0). The opportunity
cost of cash flow is the cost of capital, for simplicity, I set equal to 1. Given that the
9Here, I assume that shareholders have an effective monitoring on manager and that the compensation
is based on firm’s profits. Therefore, the manager has no incentive or opportunity to over-invest.
10Ideally, the board of shareholders and the board of directors are in charge of the appointment of
managers. However, given that corporate governance was not well-established and the boards were weak
before 2005, the controlling shareholder usually had excess power when appointing managers.
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capital market is imperfect, firms face additional costs of external funds C(E), which is
increasing and strictly convex in E.
Thus the manager faces the following optimization problem:
max
I
{F (I)− C(E)− I − αF (I)}
= max
I
{(1− α)F (I)− C(I −W )− I} s.t. I = W + E (1.2)
where the first term is investment return after expropriation, the second term is cost of
external capital, and last term is the opportunity cost of investment.
I solve the model with backward induction. Since the manager observes the controlling
shareholder’s expropriation α before choosing I, in principle the manager could condition
his choice of I on the observed level of α. Therefore, the manager’s strategy is to choose
for each α, the level of I that solves equation (2). The manager’s optimal reaction func-
tion is thereby denoted as I∗(α,W ). The controlling shareholder’s strategy is to maximize
his/her private benefits given I∗(α,W ), so that the controlling shareholder’s optimal ex-
propriation level α∗(k, I) is the solution to maxα {αF (I∗(α,W ))− c(k, α)F (I∗(α,W ))}.
The following propositions summarize the predictions in this two-stage model. The proofs
are presented in Part A of the Appendix.
Proposition 1 Assume that cαα > 0 and ckα > 0, then the expropriation of minority
shareholders is less with better protection of shareholders, that is,
dα∗(k, I)
dk
< 0
Proposition 2 Assume that C ′′(E) > 0 and F ′′(I) < 0, then the investment is sensitive
11
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to cash flow, that is,
dI∗(α,W )
dW
> 0.
The following proposition assumes a set of sufficient conditions, namely, a) F (I) and
C(E) are both quadratic functions, or b) F (I) is a quadratic function and C ′′′(E) < 0,
c) F ′′′(I) < 0 and C(E) is a quadratic function, or d) F ′′′(I) < 0 and C ′′′(E) < 0.
Proposition 3 Investment to cash flow sensitivity increases with a higher proportion of
expropriation (α), that is,
d
dα
(
dI∗(α,W )
dW
) > 0.
When the assumptions for Prop (1), (2), and (3) hold, I have:
Proposition 4 Investment to cash flow sensitivity decreases with better shareholder pro-
tection (k), that is,
d
dk
(
dI∗(α∗,W )
dW
) < 0.
Proposition 1 is similar to the results in Porta et al. (2002). If the marginal cost of expro-
priation increases as more is diverted (cαα > 0) and if the marginal cost of expropriation
is higher when tradable shareholders have better legal protection (ckα > 0), then the
expropriation is lower with a better shareholder protection scheme.
The policy announcement in 2004 was designed to improve the protection of minor-
ity shareholders. When controlling shareholders’ wealth is evaluated by market value,
marginal cost of expropriation rises sharply due to the possible punishment from the
stock price. More importantly, previous studies have mostly documented that control-
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ling shareholders expropriate mainly through related-party transactions, and the China
Securities Regulatory Commission requires listed companies to disclose the amount and
nature of each RPT. Therefore, the announcement of RPTs with tunneling intention can
lead to negative market reactions, thereby allowing us to reasonably expect expropriation
to become less prevalent after the reform. The evidence from the literature is consistent
with this notion.11 Overall, Proposition 1 is consistent with the existing literature.
Proposition 2 requires strict convexity for the cost of external finance and strict con-
cavity of the production function, which is consistent with findings in Kaplan and Zingales
(1997). These requirements suggest that investment and cash flow are positively corre-
lated. A convex function for external finance implies an imperfect capital market. If the
capital market was frictionless, i.e., C(E) = 0, and C ′′(.) = 0, then internal and external
finance would be perfectly substitutable and investment expenditures would not respond
to cash flow ( dI
∗
dW
= 0). Figure 1 further provides a graphic explanation of Proposition
2, where the x-axis represents investment and cash flow, while the y-axis represents the
marginal cost of external finance C ′, and marginal return to investment F ′. (1− α)F ′ is
the marginal return to investment after expropriation. Given a small cash flow fluctua-
tion (∆W ), investment increases by ∆I, which reflects ICF sensitivity.
Proposition 3 argues that the ICF sensitivity increases with a higher fraction of ex-
propriation from the controlling shareholder. Intuitively, a higher fraction of stealing
will generate lower investment returns (1 − α)F ′, whereas external finance is relatively
more costly to obtain even though the absolute cost may not change. Thus, firms have
to rely heavily on low-cost internal funds to invest due to the comparatively larger cost-
wedge between internal and external finance. In addition, Proposition 3 further requires
11For instance, Liu and Tian (2012) support this view by showing a declining amount of inter-corporate
loans and positive market-adjusted cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement of RPTs for
private firms. Additionally, other articles record a declining fraction of firms conducting RPTs and the
incentives for tunneling after the SSSR (e.g., Liao et al., 2014).
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the satisfaction of either set of the four sufficient conditions. Condition (a) requires
quadratic functional forms for both C(E) and F (I), while condition (b) requires F (I)
to be quadratic and the third derivate of C(E) is negative (as is the case with a simple
convex function like Eρ, where 1 < ρ < 2). Condition (c) requires that C(E) is quadratic
and the third derivate of F (I) is negative. Condition (d) requires that the third deriva-
tive of both C(E) and F (I) will be negative.12 However, this proposition would break
down if the controlling shareholder extracts his/her proportion of net profits from the
firm, i.e., the expropriation is equal to α[F (I)−C(I−W )−I]. Therefore, ICF sensitivity
does not depend on α, i.e. d
dα
[ dI
∗
dW
] = 0.
Figure 2 illustrates the findings in Proposition 3 with the sufficient condition (c) as
an example; that is, C(E) is quadratic and F ′′′(I) < 0, where αL or αH represents a rel-
atively lower or higher level of expropriation. C ′(E) is linear because I assume C(E) is a
quadratic function. F ′(I) is strictly concave because F ′′′(I) < 0.13 I consider two firms
facing the same marginal cost of external finance, but different levels of expropriation.
Given the same amount of cash flow increasing (∆W ), investment is more responsive
to W at αH than αL (∆IαH > ∆IαL). This suggests that investment demand is more
sensitive to α as W rises.
The interpretation of Proposition 4 is the combined effects from Proposition 1 and
3. Given that d
dk
[ dI
∗
dW
] = d
dα
[ dI
∗
dW
] ∗ dα
dk
, when expropriation decreases along with better
protection of tradable (minority) shareholders and ICF sensitivity decreases with a lower
level of expropriation, ICF sensitivity decreases along with a better shareholder protec-
tion. Since one of the targets of the SSSR is to curb the controlling shareholder’s abuse
12Under conditions (a) and (b), F (I) is a quadratic, concave production function, thereby implying
that the solution is a local optimal condition. For instance, F (I) may take the form of AI − BI2 if
0 < I < A2B . Conditions (c) and (d) are the assumptions for global optimal.
13The intuition of F ′′′(I) < 0 implies that over a range, the marginal return to investment (investment
demand) is likely to be high and decrease slowly (so that F ′′(I) is small). At some point, F ′(I) changes
from declining slowly to declining rapidly, which corresponds to F ′′′(I) < 0.
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of power and provide legal protection for minority shareholders, the establishment of
legal mechanisms can improve corporate governance in China. Thus, k increases while α
decreases, such that ICF sensitivity decreases after the reform.
1.4 Data
1.4.1 Description of Sample and Dataset
The data used in this paper are drawn from the China Stock Market and Accounting
Research (CSMAR) Database. The sample consists of all firms listed on the main board
of the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 1998 to 2014, excluding those firms
in the financial sectors (i.e., finance and insurance as well as real estate). I drop these
sectors because they are highly regulated and their operating and investing activities are
distinct from those of other sectors. I also drop firms that has been listed for less than a
year as well as those firms under special treatment (ST).14 I winsorize the observations
at 1% and 99% for the main regression variables to minimize the influence of outliers.
Table C1 in the Appendix provides the variable definitions, and Table 1 tabulates the
summary statistics for the main variables.
The unbalanced panel consists of 15,482 firm-year observations and 1,314 unique
firms. Among these firms, 1,134 have completed the conversion of NTS, while the rest
of firms did not complete this process. The latter firms have been classified into two
groups, namely, (a) firms delisted before the reform, and (b) firms issued after the reform
(not having NTS). Including these firms helps increase the precision of my estimates of
14Stocks in danger of being delisted are under special treatment (ST) in China, such as firms with
negative net profits for two consecutive years. The main results also hold if I include these firms in my
sample.
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normal ICF sensitivity. I do not impose restriction that firms must be listed continuously
across the whole sample period.
1.4.2 Variables and Summary Statistics
Panel A of Table 1 reports the summary statistics on investment expenditure, cash
flow, and other control variables. Interest rate refers to the financial expenses over
interest-carrying liabilities and measures the cost of debt.15 Total capital expenditures is
the measure of total investment (Inv) and cash flow (CF ) is the earnings before interest,
tax, depreciation, and amortization. All variables are scaled by the net fixed capital of
the previous year, except Tobin’s Q and interest rate. Table C1 in the Appendix pro-
vides the definitions for all variables. In terms of means, cash flow shows an increasing
pattern and total investment shows a decreasing pattern, thereby suggesting the possible
reduction of ICF sensitivity after the reform. For comparison, one can examine the rates
in Chinese firms with those in the U.S. firms. Despite differences in the institutional
environments of these two countries, some of the investment and cash flow variables are
comparable in magnitude. In Hovakimian (2009), the average investment-capital ratio
for U.S. manufacturing firms during 1985-2004 is 0.273, while the cash flow-capital ratio
is 0.379. Both of these indices are lower than those for Chinese firms. Panel B reports
the pre-reform firm features by the end of 2003. The fraction of NTS consists of around
60% of the total shares. In addition, around 75% of the listed companies in 2003 are
SOEs.16
15Since the CSMAR dataset does not include the amount of interest paid, I use a parsimonious proxy
for interest rate, namely, financial expenses over interest-carrying liabilities. Financial expense is the
sum of net interest (interest paid - interest earned), exchange gains or loses, and commission charges.
The interest-carrying liabilities include short-term borrowing and long-term debt.
16I define SOEs and non-SOEs based on their ultimate controlling party in the year prior to the policy
announcement. Following previous studies, I define a firm as a SOE if its ultimate controller is the state;
non-SOEs include private companies and mixed ownership but without state control (e.g., Liao et al.,
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1.5 Empirical Findings
1.5.1 ICF Sensitivity: the Baseline Regression
First, I check whether a correlation exists between investment and cash flow after
controlling for investment opportunities in Chinese listed firms. My starting point is the
extended Q-model for investment-cash flow sensitivity, which is expressed as follows:
Invi,j,t
Ki,j,t−1
= α0 + β1
CFi,j,t
Ki,j,t−1
+ β2Qi,j,t−1 + β3
Salei,j,t−1
Ki,j,t−1
+ αi + αt + αj,t + i,j,t (1.3)
where the subscript i, j, and t denote for firm, industry, and year (1998-2014), re-
spectively. The dependent variable Inv is capital expenditures. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Tradi-
tional Q-investment models control for Tobin’s Q as a proxy for investment opportunities.
I also include Sale as a control variable. Total sales approximate for production, to take
into account the accelerator effects. Including this variable is important because produc-
tion positively influences investment expenditures (Abel and Blanchard, 1986; Fazzari
et al., 1988). I use the beginning-of-period values of all regressors (except CF ) in order
to avoid reverse causality. In all specifications, I include firm fixed effects (αi) to con-
trol for the time-invariant firm characteristics omitted in the regression. I also include
industry-by-year fixed effects (αj,t), controlling for shocks to a certain industry at a spe-
cific year.17 The coefficient β2 represents investment-cash flow sensitivity.
2014).
17Year fixed effects (αt) are absorbed by industry-by-year fixed effects, where αt controls for changing
macroeconomic conditions. The industry is based on the one-letter code used by the China Securities
Regulatory Commission. See the note in Table C1 for specific industrial classification.
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I present the estimates of this equation in columns (1) and (3) of Table 2, and the
results are consistent with the view that these firms rely on cash flow to finance their
investment after controlling for growth opportunities and production. The coefficient of
CF is between 0.209 and 0.268 (significant at the 1% level), which shows that investment
is sensitivity to cash flow. This is consistent with the prediction of Proposition 2. There-
fore, an additional RMB in cash flow of the current year will lead to 0.21-0.27 RMB in
investment spending even after controlling for investment opportunities and production.
The adjusted R2 almost doubles when adding Sale as a control variable. In column (5),
the results are robust to the specification of Euler equation model of investment, where I
use debt, beginning-of-period total investment, and its squared term to proxy for invest-
ment opportunities (Bond and Meghir, 1994). Table 2 also shows that the coefficients on
Tobin’s Q and Sale are significantly positive as expected, thereby indicating that invest-
ment expenditure increases with better investment opportunity and higher production.
1.5.2 ICF Sensitivity: the Interaction Regression
In the next set of regressions, I formally test whether the reform affects ICF sensitivity.
Given that the SSSR alleviates agency-conflict, I would observe that ICF sensitivity
declines after the reform. To test this hypothesis, I include a regime-shift dummy Post
and its interaction term with CF in the equation (4) as follows:
Invi,j,t
Ki,j,t−1
= α0 + β1
CFi,j,t
Ki,j,t−1
+ β2
CFi,j,t
Ki,j,t−1
∗ Postt + β3Qi,j,t−1 + β4Salei,j,t−1
Ki,j,t−1
+ αi + αj,t + i,j,t
(1.4)
where Post is the “treatment dummy”, that is an indicator variable equal to 1 af-
ter the announcement year, and equal to 0 otherwise. The interaction term CF*Post
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measures the average ICF sensitivity after policy announcement. The rest of the vari-
ables, fixed effects, and standard errors are the same as those in equation (3). In 2004,
the State Council introduced “Some Opinions of the State Council on Promoting the
Reform, Opening and Steady Growth of Capital Market” and explicitly emphasized the
importance of actively yet prudently solving the split-share structure problem. I use the
announcement time (year 2004) to classify the pre- and post- reform periods for two rea-
sons. First, after its announcement by the State Council, firms perceived the guideline
as a strong signal for an upcoming reform. Rather than wait until the end, they pre-
ferred to make adjust quickly and accordingly when they had such expectation in order
to maintain a favorable position. This preference is particularly true in China because
of powerful government interventions. Second, the announcement time is exogenous and
can avoid the potential endogenous timing problem in policy completion. By estimating
ICF sensitivity before and after the announcement, I could identify the impacts of the
announcement for the same set of firms in a time-series framework.
Table 2 presents the results of the interaction regression for each specification, tradi-
tional Q-investment model (column (2)), extended Q-investment model (column (4)), and
Euler equation model (column (6)). In all specifications, the coefficient on CF is positive
and statistically significant, suggesting that, investment relied on cash flow during the
pre-announcement period. However, the coefficient on CF that interacts with the Post
dummy is negative and statistically significant, thereby implying that ICF sensitivity is
lower after the announcement. This observation becomes particularly apparent when the
results contrast with the baseline regression. For instance, in column (4), ICF sensitivity
drops from 0.273 to 0.193 (= 0.273 - 0.080). However, at this stage, we do not know
which factors drive the declines in sensitivity.
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1.5.3 Controlling Shareholders’ Expropriation and ICF Sensi-
tivity: Ownership Structures
From Proposition 3, if controlling shareholders’ expropriation drives ICF sensitivity,
I hypothesize that those firms with higher pre-reform expropriation will exhibit a higher
ICF sensitivity during the pre-announcement period and experience larger declines in
the sensitivity afterward. Given that the announcement is designed to protect minority
shareholders and alleviate expropriation by the controlling shareholder, I expect that
those firms with a large divergence in ownership structures will respond more to the
policy. Therefore, I perform a difference-in-differences (DD) analysis in equation (5) to
test this prediction:
Invi,j,t
Ki,j,t−1
= α0 + β1
CFi,j,t
Ki,j,t−1
+ β2
CFi,j,t
Ki,j,t−1
∗ Postt + β3Zi ∗ CFi,j,t
Ki,j,t−1
∗ Postt + β4Zi ∗ Posti,t
+ β5Zi ∗ CFi,j,t
Ki,j,t−1
+ β6Qi,j,t−1 + β7
Salei,j,t−1
Ki,j,t−1
+ αi + αt + αj,t + i,j,t (1.5)
where I include the same set of fixed effects and control variables as in equation (4).
Zi measures the pre-announcement of the controlling shareholders’ expropriation. The
coefficient of the triple interaction term (β3) is the DD estimator that captures the effect
of controlling shareholders’ expropriation on ICF sensitivity after the SSSR. The coeffi-
cient on Zi ∗ Posti,t (β4) measures the effect of expropriation on ICF sensitivity during
the pre-announcement period. According to Propositions 3 and 4, β3 must be negative,
while β4 must be positive.
A firm’s ownership structure, specifically the disparity in the controlling shareholders’
ownership and control (excess control) rights, is a common measure for the controlling
shareholder’s incentive to expropriate minority shareholders.18 When the divergence is
18Consistent with the standard definition, ownership (cash flow) rights are the sum of the products of
the proportion of ownership along the control chains, while the control (voting) rights are the minimum
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high, the controlling shareholders can play an essential role in operations with only a
relatively small direct stake in cash flow rights, thereby internalizing only part of their
financial costs.19
I use the following variables to measure pre-reform ownership structures: (1) Sdummy
(separation dummy) is a dummy equal to 1 if the control rights of the largest shareholder
exceed the cash-flow rights, and equal to 0 otherwise. Thus, those firms with excess con-
trol rights (Sdummy = 1) can be seen as the treatment group, while those firms without
excess control rights is the control group. (2) Excess (excess control rights) is a con-
tinuous variable that measures cash flow rights subtracted from the control rights of the
largest shareholder. Having high excess control rights implies controlling shareholders
can expropriate minority shareholders with less restraints.
The first three columns of Table 3 present the estimates that link ownership structures
and ICF sensitivity for the whole sample. Column (1) reports the baseline regression in
equation (5) with Sdummy. Column (2) reports a similar specification using Excess.
Column (3) includes two variables to control for financing determinants of investment. I
include cash holdings because cash is an important source of funds to finance investment.
I also control for interest rate because a large proportion of external financing in Chinese
firms comes from bank loans, and interest rate can be used as a proxy for costs of debt.
As noted, interest rate, cash, and cash flow represent the financial condition of a firm in
a more comprehensive way compared with cash flow only.
The estimates of all three specifications are consistent with the view that firms with
ex-ante high separation of ownership and control rights experience economically and sta-
proportion of ownership along the control chains (Faccio and Lang, 2002).
19By way of illustration, if Firm A owns 80% in Firm B and if Firm B owns 70% in Firm C, then
control rights of Firm A in Firm C is 70%, while its ownership rights in Firm C is 56%(=70%*80%). A
sale of overpriced assets from Firms A to C for a value of $3,000 will result in a net loss of $3,000 for the
shareholders in Firm C. However, the ultimate controller (Firm A) will have a net cash flow of $1,320
(=$3,000*(1-56%)).
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tistically significant declines in their ICF sensitivities after the SSSR announcement. In
column (1), the coefficient on β1 is 0.217 (significant at the 1% level), thereby indicating
that an additional dollar of cash flow in the current year leads to nearly $0.22 of capital
expenditures after controlling for investment opportunities and sales in firms without
excess control. The coefficient estimate for β4 is 0.095, significant at the 10% level, sug-
gesting that firms with excess control rights have experienced a 31.2% (=0.217+0.095)
ICF sensitivity before 2003. The DD effect (β3) is -0.146, thereby indicating that the
ICF sensitivities in those firms have declined to 16.6%(=0.217+0.095-0.146) after the
announcement. Moreover, the coefficients on β3 and β4 are comparable in magnitude
and the sum of these two coefficients are statistically insignificant from zero (p-value =
0.28). This suggests that the reform has almost closed the gap in ICF sensitivity for
firms with or without excess controls.
More importantly, I argue that Proposition 4 explains the declining ICF sensitivity
shown in Section 5.2. In particular, ICF sensitivity decreases as the reform provides bet-
ter legal shareholder protection because controlling shareholders’ expropriation leads to
ICF sensitivity (thereby verifying Proposition 3), and the SSSR announcement provides
better investor protection and alleviates the incentive to expropriation (Proposition 1 is
supported by the literature). The validation of those two propositions assures the pre-
diction in Proposition 4.
Under the second specification, since Excess is measured in percentage points, a one
standard deviation increase in the separation of ownership and control rights induces a
7.7% (=6.982*0.011) decrease in the ICF sensitivity at the 5% significance level. The
sample size is smaller in column (3) because Interest rate is missing for some firm-year
observations. The DD estimator is -0.008, which is significant at the 10% level, thereby
suggesting that the financial determinants of investment only partially explain the effect
of expropriation on ICF sensitivity. With respect to the coefficients on the control vari-
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ables, as expected, I find that investment is positively correlated with Tobin’s Q, total
sales, and cash holdings, but is negatively associated with interest rate.
Moreover, many previous studies limit their samples to manufacturing firms only in
the context of ICF sensitivity (e.g., Fazzari et al., 1988; Chen and Chen, 2012). The
preceding estimations include all firms from non-financial sectors because the reform
has affected almost all listed companies. To be consistent with previous research, I re-
estimate the three specifications with manufacturing firms only based on the one-digit
industrial codes published by the China Securities Regulatory Commission.
The last three columns of Table 3 present the findings. According to the DD esti-
mators, the effect of ownership structures on ICF sensitivity is more pronounced across
all specifications in manufacturing firms. In column (4), the DD effect in manufacturing
firms (-0.254, significant at the 5% level) is larger in magnitude than that in the whole
sample, suggesting that the ICF sensitivity is 38.0% (0.213+0.167) for manufacturing
firms with excess control rights in the pre-announcement period, and such sensitivity de-
clines to 12.6% (0.213+0.167-0.254) after 2004. In addition, the DD estimator in column
(5) indicates that a one standard deviation increase in the divergence of ownership and
control rights induces a 14.0% decline in the ICF sensitivity of manufacturing firms at
the 5% significant level, which is higher than the 7.7% decline of the whole sample. The
DD coefficient barely changes when the additional control variables in column (6) are
added, which suggests that, the financial determinants do not drive my findings, at least
for the manufacturing firms.20
Figure 3 shows the event-study graph for testing the parallel trend assumption. Panel
A is for the whole sample, which corresponds to column (1), while Panel B is for manufac-
turing firms only, which corresponds to column (4). The solid black line plots the change
20In the untabulated results, I also a find similar effect in non-manufacturing firms. However, the DD
coefficients are smaller in magnitude and statistically significant at the 10% level.
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of β3 over time and the dash lines plot the 95% upper and lower bounds of confidence in-
tervals. The omitted year is 2014. According to Panel A, no pre-trend is observed before
the announcement. Although it seems noisy, the tendency shows a positive difference
in ICF sensitivity between firms with and without divergence of ownership and control
rights before 2003. The ICF sensitivity converges to zero after the reform for the two
groups of firms. This situation is more noticeable in Panel B. Before 2003, a positive gap
is observed in ICF sensitivity with an increasing tendency, suggesting that the effects of
expropriation on ICF sensitivity are highly pronounced. However, the difference in ICF
sensitivity decreases immediately after the announcement and the coefficients fluctuate
around zero afterward, thereby indicating that the SSSR alleviates the effects by reduc-
ing the less incentives of expropriation. In addition, the 95% confidence intervals shift
downward from a (mostly) positive region to a region (mostly) centered around zero.
Overall, the figure ensures that the required assumption in DD is satisfied and shows
that the effect of expropriation on ICF sensitivity is more pronounced in manufacturing
firms than in other types of firms.
However, one caveat in explaining the findings is that an endogenous missing data
problem can underestimate the effects of controlling shareholders’ expropriation on ICF
sensitivity. The information for the largest shareholder’s control and ownership rights
are only available beginning from 2003 in CSMAR. After 2004, the China Securities
Regulatory Commission required the annual reports of firms to disclose the diagram
of the control chain, which is used to calculate ownership and control rights. Missing
data are generated because around 29% of the firms in the whole sample did not (vol-
untarily) release such information in their 2003 annual reports. These firms are more
likely to show divergence in their ownership and control rights because they do not want
the outside investors to detect such disparity.21 Otherwise, investors will expect their
21The average controlling shareholders’ excess control rights are 3.6% in 2003 and 6.2% in 2004-2005.
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money to be diverted by the controlling shareholder, thereby requiring a higher risk pre-
mium when providing capital for these firms. Therefore, I argue that the actual effects
of expropriation on ICF sensitivity could be more noticeable than the findings in Table 3.
1.5.4 SOE and non-SOEs
I further partition the sample into SOEs and non-SOEs. The incentives of expropri-
ation are stronger in non-SOEs because the controlling shareholders pursue maximizing
returns, including private returns through diverting firms’ resources. Additionally, man-
agers in private firms, particularly those in emerging markets, are usually part of the
controlling shareholders, thereby making expropriation easier to conduct. Therefore, I
would expect that the DD effects of controlling shareholders’ expropriation on ICF sen-
sitivity are more pronounced among private firms.
Table 4 separately reports the estimates for SOE and non-SOEs. The first four
columns show the results for the whole sample, while the last four columns show the
results for manufacturing firms only. I choose Excess as the measure of ownership struc-
tures, and the results are robust when Sdummy is used as the proxy. The first two
columns show that the DD effect for SOEs is -0.007, and is statistically insignificant at
conventional level, while the DD effect for private firms is -0.020, and is statistically sig-
nificant at the 5% level. The findings also become larger in magnitude (-0.018) and only
significant in private firms (at the 5% level) when controls for the financial determinants
of investment are included. As for manufacturing firms, the DD effect becomes even more
pronounced in private firms but barely changes in SOEs. For instance, in column (8),
a one standard deviation increase in the divergence of ownership structure results in a
23.0% (=0.033*6.982) reduction in ICF sensitivity for private firms in the manufacturing
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sector, significant at the 1% level. But the corresponding estimation for SOEs in column
(7) is -0.008, which is also insignificant. Taken together, although I cannot reject the
null hypothesis that the difference in the effect of expropriation on ICF sensitivity is zero
for SOE and non-SOEs, private firms mainly drive the decline even though they only
account for 1/3 of the observations.22
1.5.5 Controlling Shareholders’ Expropriation and ICF Sensi-
tivity: RPTs
I use the average amount of pre-announcement RPTs as an additional measure of ex-
propriation (Zi) because previous studies reveal that controlling shareholders use RPTs
to conduct expropriation, especially under the context in China (e.g., Johnson et al.,
2000; Jiang et al., 2010; Chen et al., 2012). RPTs are transactions between the parent
company (controlling shareholder) and its subsidiary (the listed company) that involve
inter-corporate loans, asset sales, equity sales, trading relationships, and cash payments
to connected parties (Cheung et al., 2006). A parent company can extract resources
from its listed firms through unfair, “self-dealing” transactions. In particular, given the
highly concentrated ownership, limited tradability of majority shares, and weak investor
protection, expropriation through RPTs become very evident in China.23 For instance,
in the normal course of business of Chinese firms, the parent company can acquire inter-
corporate loans from its listed companies with preferential terms, such as, no interest
22I note that the mean of Excess for non-SOE (SOE) firms is 6.84 (2.19) percentage points. The
differential DD effect may also be driven by the relatively high separation ratio in private firms. How-
ever, given that ownership structures are endogenous, the controlling shareholders in non-SOEs could
intentionally create such disparity in order to expropriate minority shareholders with less restraints.
23Admittedly, RPTs occur for reasons other than expropriation. Firms benefit from transactions with
its connected parties as long as they are dealing at arm’s length. Therefore, measurement errors occur
when using RPTs to approximate for expropriation, working against finding results.
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accruals (Jiang et al., 2010). Therefore, by providing RPTs as an additional proxy, I
hope that I can show the effect of controlling shareholders’ expropriation on ICF sensi-
tivity, and the extent to which this effect remains robust across alternative measures.
I use two proxies to measure the average pre-reform RPTs. The first proxy is a time-
invariant dummy variable RPTHigh, which is equals to 1 if the average amount of RPT
scaled by total sales between 1998 and 2003 is above its median, and equal to 0 otherwise.
Therefore, the treatment group is RPTHigh = 1 and the control group is RPTHigh = 0.
No “perfect” control group exists because even the group with smaller RPT is affected
by the reform. The second proxy is the nature log of the average amount of pre-reform
RPT (Ln(1 + RPT )) without scaling, which explores the effects of expropriation as a
continuous variable. Those firms with high RPTs are more likely to suffer from severe
controlling shareholders’ expropriation. I expect the DD effect (β3) to be negative and
β4 to be positive.
Table 5 presents the estimates for those specifications in RPTs for the whole sam-
ple. Column (1) reports the findings in the baseline specification (equation (5)) using
RPTHigh. Column (2) additionally controls for cash holdings and interest rate. Columns
(3)-(4) separately estimate equation (5) for SOEs and private firms. Columns (5)-(6)
show the estimates, including additional controls with Ln(1 +RPT ), for SOEs and pri-
vate owned firms, respectively.
The estimates of all specifications are consistent with the view that firms with ex-ante
high RPTs respond more to the reform. In column (1), the coefficient on RPTHigh*Postt
is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level, suggesting that the above median
RPT firms experience a 12.5% greater ICF sensitivity than the below median firms be-
fore 2004. More importantly, the DD estimator is negative and statistically different from
zero at the 5% level, which suggests that those firms also exhibit a 12.9% greater decline
in ICF sensitivity after the reform. The DD effect is -14.2% when additional variables for
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the financial determinants of investment are included.24. Moreover, the coefficients on
β3 and β4 are similar in magnitude and the sum of these two coefficients are statistically
insignificant from zero (p-value = 0.91). This suggests that the reform has closed the
gap in ICF sensitivity for firms with high and low RPTs.
The last four columns of Table 5 suggest that private firms mainly drive the decline
in ICF sensitivity when using RPT as a proxy for controlling shareholders’ expropria-
tion. Columns (3)-(4) indicate that the DD effect is greater in magnitude (-0.170) and
only significant in non-SOEs. The same pattern also holds true when treating RPT as a
continuos variable as reported in columns (5)-(6). In column (6), a 10% increase in the
amount of RPT induces a 12% decrease in post-reform ICF sensitivity, which is signifi-
cant at the 5% level. However, the DD estimators for SOEs are statistically insignificant
and smaller in magnitude. I obtain an even more pronounced effect in non-SOEs when
including manufacturing firms only. It is not unexpected given that expropriating in-
centives are stronger for controlling shareholders in private firms than the government
agencies in SOEs.
To test the parallel trend assumption, Figure 4 presents an event-study graph of β3
corresponding to the specification in column (2). First, the coefficients of β3 are positive
and shows no pre-trend before 2003. After the announcement, the difference in ICF
sensitivity decreases immediately and the coefficients fluctuate around zero afterward.
This observation implies that those firms with above median RPT tend to remain a
relatively high pre-reform ICF sensitivity, and experience a contemporaneous reduction
in such sensitivity at the time of the announcement. The difference in ICF sensitivity
between those two RPT groups converges to zero over time. Overall, although the confi-
dence interval is noisy, Figure 4 ensures that the required assumptions in DD are satisfied.
24The results still hold when using median regression, suggesting that the findings are robust to outliers
and non-normal errors. In addition, the results are robust when RPTHigh is defined as scaling RPT by
total assets instead of total sales.
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1.5.6 Robustness Check
Alternative Measure for Controlling Shareholders’ Expropriation
I provide an alternative firm-specific measure of the incentives of controlling share-
holders’ expropriation, that is the monitoring intensity by large (non-controlling) share-
holders. Following Chen et al. (2012), I measure it as the sum of shares collectively held
by the second to the fifth largest shareholders (as a percentage of total shares) multiplying
a Herfindahl index for the concentration of shares, averaged over the pre-announcement
period. Thus, a higher external monitoring intensity implies that large (non-controlling)
shareholders hold more shares in a highly concentrated way. Therefore, these sharehold-
ers have more direct stake and voting power in the firm. I hypothesize that stronger
monitor by large shareholders will limit the opportunities and abilities of the controlling
shareholders to expropriate. In other words, I expect that firms with ex-ante lower mon-
itoring will experience a significant and greater reduction in ICF sensitivity.
Table 6 reports the split sample estimation based on monitoring intensity. Columns
(3) and (4) control for the financing determinants of investment, namely, Cash and Cost
of debt. The results indicate that for those firms with below median level of monitor-
ing, a statistically significant 14.3% reduction in ICF sensitivity is observed as shown in
column (2). Meanwhile, an 11.3% reduction in ICF sensitivity (significant at the 10%
level) is observed if additional controls for financial condition are included. However,
the corresponding estimated changes are not statistically significant for those firms with
an above median monitoring level. These estimates suggest that those firms with lower
monitoring by large shareholders mainly drive the declines in ICF sensitivity, which is
consistent with the notion that expropriation leads to ICF sensitivity. Therefore, I verify
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the causal link between controlling shareholders’ expropriation and ICF sensitivity as
well as the extent to which this effect is robust across three different measures, namely,
excess control rights, RPTs, and large shareholder monitoring.
Endogenous Control
My research design assumes the SSSR as an exogenous shock the incentives of con-
trolling shareholders’ expropriation, with no effects on the variables that are uncorrelated
with such incentive but also affect ICF sensitivity. In particular, if the SSSR affects the
cash flow or investment opportunities differently for firms with high or low expropriation,
my findings would be subject to endogenous control problems. In this case, for example,
a negative DD coefficient my be attributed to an increasing (decreasing) cash flow for
firms with more (less) controlling shareholders’ expropriation.
I explicitly test the endogenous control problem by regressing each control vari-
ables, including cash flow, Tobin’s Q, interest rate, cash holdings, and total sales on
Post*Sdummy, with the rest of the controls (other than the dependent variable itself).
Thus, the coefficients of the interaction terms capture the heterogenous effects for firms
with or without separation of ownership and control rights.
Table 6 presents the coefficients on Post*Sdummy, and the results from all specifica-
tions suggest that the DD effects does not seem to be biased by endogenous controls. In
column (1), the dependent variable is cash flow and the control variables include Tobin’s
Q, sale, cash, and interest rate. The coefficient of interest is small in magnitude (0.001)
and statistically insignificant, thereby implying no heterogenous effects on cash flow for
firms with or without excess control rights. The effects on Tobin’s Q, interest rate, and
cash holdings are also negligible as shown in columns (2)-(4). No endogenous control
problems are also observed in Sale. The coefficients on Post*Sdummy are statistically
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insignificant and small in magnitude when using Post*Excess and Post*Ln(1 + RPT )
to measure the level of expropriation (results are not tabulated).
Alternative Sample Time Selection
The third set of robustness check comes from an alternative sample time selection.
The sample period in the main results is from 1998 to 2014. I reestimate the regressions
from Table 2 to Table 5 with observations from 2000 to 2007 because the alternative sam-
ple time eliminates the potential impacts from the post-2007 financial crisis. In addition,
the sample is symmetric around the time of announcement in 2004. I obtain quanti-
tatively similar results using this alternative time selection (results are untabulated),
thereby ensuring that the data construction procedure is not an important determinant
of my results.
1.6 Potential Concerns
1.6.1 Manager’s Over-investment
The reform could also mitigate the canonical principle-agent problem between man-
agers and shareholders, and reduce manager’s over-investment. This is because holders
of NTS (usually the controlling shareholder) paid less attention to a firm’s operating
performance under the two-tier structure. Due to the lack of monitoring intensity, man-
agers in firms with available free cash flow tended to engage in wasteful expenditure.
But when NTS are associated with market price, the benefits of monitoring increase for
controlling shareholders. They tend to form stronger monitoring intensity on managers,
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and develop better incentive compensations based on the manager’s performance, which
results in the establishment of professional manager markets. Therefore, if those firms
suffering from high expropriation were also the ones experiencing more severe pre-reform
over-investment, attributing the declines in ICF sensitivity to expropriation could be
problematic.
This subsection tests this alternative explanation by examining the subsample effects
of expropriation on ICF sensitivity in firms with different likelihood of over-investment
and by explicitly estimating the sensitivity of over-investment to free cash flow. If the
mitigation of manager’s over-investment could explain the findings, I would expect to see
significant declines in over-investment and free cash flow sensitivity for firms with high
expropriation, and/or the DD effect (β3) is more prominent in firms with high likelihood
of over-investment. Admittedly, neither of these two approaches could perfectly measure
agency-conflict between managers and shareholders. My hope is that, by using two dif-
ferent methodologies, I can increase the power and accuracy of my test when rule out
this alternative explanation.
Within-Sample Comparison: The Likelihood of Over-Investment
I partition the firms based on the likelihood of manager’s over-investment. If those
firms with higher expropriation are suffering from severe agency costs of free cash flow,
then the effects of controlling shareholders’ expropriation on ICF sensitivity will be sig-
nificant and larger in firms with a high likelihood of over-investment. First, I use cash
balance as a partitioning variable based on the argument that firms with large cash
holdings are more likely to face managers’ overspending (e.g., Jensen, 1986; Opler et al.,
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1999; Biddle et al., 2009).25 I also use leverage ratio as another proxy for the likelihood of
over-investment because debt mitigates overspending by reducing the cash flow available
for expenditures at the discretion of managers Jensen, 1986. Moreover, high leverage
firms tend to experience under-investment due to a potential debt overhang problem,
thereby leading to a lower likelihood of over-investment (e.g., Myers, 1977). Thus, firms
with high cash holdings and low leverage will potentially suffer more from manager’s
over-investment.
Table 9 presents the subsample estimation of equation (5) based on the likelihood of
over-investment with a full set of control variables. Cash holding is computed as cash
and cash equivalents divided by total assets, while leverage is the ratio of total debt to
total assets. Columns (1)-(2) report the results for firms with high versus low values of
pre-announcement cash holdings, while columns (3)-(4) report the results for firms with
high versus low values of leverage. The coefficient estimate for the triple interaction term
is larger in magnitude for firms with below median cash holdings (-0.013) and above
median leverage (-0.013), and is statistically insignificant and small in magnitude with
above median cash holdings (-0.005) and below median leverage (-0.002). These findings
suggest that the effects of controlling shareholders’ expropriation on ICF sensitivity is not
highly pronounced in firms with a high probability of over-investment.26 Taken together,
these results are not consistent with the alternative explanation that the declines in ICF
sensitivity for firms with higher expropriation is due to the mitigation of manager’s over-
investment.
25Admittedly, firms can save cash in anticipation of financial constraints. Nonetheless, empirical evi-
dence suggests that firms with high cash holdings are more likely to face managers’ agency considerations,
such as empire building and perquisite consumption, thereby causing over-investment (e.g., Blanchard
et al., 1994; Opler et al., 1999; Biddle et al., 2009).
26I obtain qualitatively similar results (untabulated) when I replace Excess with Sdummy in the
regression and when I partition cash holdings and leverage on the subsamples of SOEs and private firms.
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The Sensitivity of Over-Investment to Free Cash Flow
I directly measure over-investment relative to the “optimal” investment following the
accounting-based framework (Richardson, 2006) as a different approach. Table C3 re-
ports the summary statistics for over- (under-) investment and free cash flow estimated.
All variables are scaled by the average total assets. The positive (negative) residuals
between actual investment and “optimal” investment are over- (under-) investment. I
include detailed information for calculating over- (under-) investment and free cash flow
in Part B of the Appendix.
If the manager’s tendency of over-investment has been restricted by a stronger mon-
itoring and a proper compensation scheme after the announcement, then I expect the
over-investment to be less responsive to free cash flow and also expect this finding to be
strongest for those firms with the highest reduction in sensitivity. For example, compared
with private firms, the main agency issue in SOEs is the agency-conflict between share-
holders and managers, given that SOEs have different objectives and principal-agent
framework (Liu and Tian, 2007). In addition, the management is usually part of the
controlling family in private firms in emerging markets, thereby leading to more efficient
monitoring on managers. Therefore, I predict that SOEs respond more to the announce-
ment in terms of reducing over-investment of free cash flow.
To test this hypothesis, I estimate equation (6) on the whole sample and the subsam-
ples based on state ownership as follows:
Ioveri,j,t
aveSizei,j,t
= α0 + β1
FCFi,j,t
aveSizei,j,t
+ β2
FCFi,j,t
aveSizei,j,t
∗ Postt + αi + αj,t + i,j,t (1.6)
The dependent variable is Over-investment. Free cash flow (FCF ) is computed as
cash flow from operations minus investment for maintenance and “optimal” investment.
The variables are scaled by the average total assets. Post is the regime-shift variable
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that is equal to 1 after announcement, and equal to 0 otherwise. The coefficient of inter-
est, β2, checks if the average free cash flow and over-investment sensitivity has changed
after the announcement. I also control for firm fixed effects (αi), year fixed effects and
industry-by-year fixed effects(αj,t).
Panel A of Table 8 reports the estimation for equation (6). Columns (1)-(3) report
the regression analysis based on the coefficients in column (1) Table C2. The last column
shows regression estimation based on the coefficients in Richardson (2006) (column (2)
of Table C2) without industry-by-year fixed effects.
Panel A shows that the SSSR alleviates the agency-conflict between managers and
shareholders and reduces the manager’s over-investment. The coefficient on FCF is eco-
nomically and statistically significant in the whole sample and SOEs, suggesting that
managers indeed conduct over-investment when free cash flow is available in SOEs. The
outcomes in the first column indicate that the decline of over-investment and free cash
flow sensitivity is economically and statistically significant. Columns (3) shows a 6.4%
decline in sensitivity for SOEs, significant at the 5% level, and shows almost no change
for non-SOEs. These estimates suggest that the declines in ICF sensitivity are mainly
driven by SOEs, which is consistent with the view that these firms suffer more from man-
ager’s over-investment compared with non-SOEs. The main results still hold in column
(4), thereby suggesting that, even if those firms were located in the U.S., they would still
face reductions in over-investment of free cash flow during the post-announcement pe-
riod. These results provide strong evidence to support that the canonical principle-agent
problem is largely alleviated after the reform.
Panel B of Table 8 shows within-sample regression based on three measurements
of pre-reform expropriation by controlling shareholders. The reduction in sensitivity is
insignificant and similar in magnitude for firms with or without excess control rights.
Meanwhile, the declines in sensitivity are marginally significance for firms with no ex-
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cess control rights, and the significant level is higher for firms with a greater monitoring
intensity. The outcomes are inconsistent with the hypothesis that firms suffering more
from expropriation are also the ones experiencing larger manager’s over-investment.
1.6.2 Financial Constraints
As another possible concern, the reduction of ICF sensitivity in firms with high con-
trolling shareholders’ expropriation can be explained by the easing financial constraints
in those companies after the SSSR. The cost wedge between internal funds as well as
external funds and the availability of internal funds are two essential aspects affecting
financial conditions. In Section 5.6, I show that cash flow does not change differently
for firms with disparate levels of expropriation. However, those firms that are suffering
greatly from expropriation can access less expensive external finance after the reform. In
particular, costs of equity are usually high in firms where controlling shareholders can
divert resources with few restraints, because outside investors could expect their money
to be expropriated, thereby requesting for a higher risk premium when providing funds
(Lins et al., 2005). Consequently, those companies can benefit from the cheaper costs of
financing due to less expropriation after the reform, thereby leading to lower dependence
of investment on cash flow. Stated differently, if firms with high expropriation were also
financially constrained before the announcement, then the negative DD effect (β3) can
be due to the lower costs of external financing after the SSSR.
I examine the changes in financial status for firms with high or low expropriation by
employing direct and indirect measures of financial constraints. Direct measures include
costs and volume of external financing. A more relaxing condition of external financing
for firms with high expropriation would implicate that these firms face relatively relaxing
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financial conditions. I also apply three indirect measures of financial constraints, namely,
cash holdings, cash-cash flow sensitivity, and underinvestment to free cash flow sensitiv-
ity. Given that ICF sensitivity is a controversial measure of financial constraints, if firms
with high expropriation have experienced relatively easing financial conditions after the
reform, then I expect to see negative DD effects in those indirect measures of financial
constraints.
Direct Measures of Financial Constraints
A. Costs of External Financing
Costs of equity and costs of debt are the two main aspects of external financing costs
in China. In Section 5, I have shown that the DD effect still holds when the interest
rate is included as an additional control variable, and costs of debt do not seem to suffer
from the endogenous control problem. Thus, I only need to examine costs of equity. One
way to estimate the change of cost of equity due to policy announcement is to obtain
the market-adjusted cumulative abnormal return (CAR) using CAPM. Specifically, the
policy announcement by the State Council on January 31 2004 may result in a positive
stock price reaction, which in turn will lead to lower costs of equity. According to the
efficient market assumption, the CAR shock around the event date will persist in the
long term if no further shocks are observed.
Table 10 reports the market-adjusted CAR for 3 days, 5 days, and 11 days around
the policy announcement date for SOEs and non-SOEs with different RPTs and excess
control. The composite index for all A-shares is used as a proxy for market returns. All
CARs are positively significantly at the 1% level, thereby indicating that the announce-
ment was unexpected and indeed lowered the cost of equity for those companies. In
addition, the CAR is higher for private firms than for SOEs, thereby suggesting that the
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announcement leads to a relatively lower cost of equity finance for non-SOEs. However,
the Difference1−0 for firms with or without excess controls, or for firms with high and low
RPT is not positively significant between SOEs and non-SOEs in those periods. These
findings are consistent with the notion that the policy announcement has lowered the
cost of equity, but the decreasing cost is statistically insignificant for firms with high or
low controlling shareholders’ expropriation.
B. Volume of External Financing
However, under credit rationing, firms are still constrained financially if they cannot
borrow or issue new equity even when the apparent costs of external finance are low
(Chen and Chen, 2012). Given that the NTS accounts for 2/3 of total shares on average,
companies have been imposed restrictions for equity issuance during the pre-reform years.
To address this concern, Figure 4 plots the change in new debt issuance, measured as the
aggregate change in total debt scaled by total assets; the new equity issuance, measured
as the aggregate change in total equity (the sum of common stock and capital surplus)
scaled by total assets. In 1998, new debt issuances account for 6% of total assets. In
2014, this fraction has declined to 4%. Such decreasing trend of new debt issuance is
statistically significant. The new equity issuances account for 6% of total assets in 1998
and 2% in 2014. This implies that although a majority shares cannot be exchanged be-
fore the reform, controlling shareholders can still issue new equity through allotment of
shares. Overall, the trends of new issue activities for debt and equity decline significantly
over time. These data do not support the view that reduction in credit rationing has
occurred after the reform.
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Indirect Measures of Financial Constraints
A. Cash Holdings
Firms usually hold cash as a precaution against future financial constraints, and ac-
cessibility to capital market explains cash holdings to a great extent (Opler et al., 1999;
Erel et al., 2015). If the reform eases the financial constraints for firms with high ex-
propriation, then the precautionary demand for holding cash (i.e., firms’ cash holding)
declines in those companies during the post-reform period. I estimate the following spec-
ification to predict the change in the amount of cash for firms with disparate ownership
structures normalized by their total assets:
Cashi,j,t/Sizei,j,t = α0 + β1Postt + β2Postt ∗ Excessi + γControlsi,j,t + αi + αj,t + i,j,t
where the coefficient Postt*Excessi captures the cash holdings for firms with different
ownership structures after the announcement. I include firm fixed effects and (one-digit)
industry-by-year fixed effects (year fixed effects are absorbed). Following Erel et al.
(2015), I include a different set of control variables, including log of firm size and its
squared term, leverage, and sales growth (see Table C1 for the variable definitions).
The estimates of cash holdings are presented in the first three columns of Table 11.
The coefficient estimate for Postt*Excessi is negligible and statistically insignificant,
and the finding holds for the whole sample, SOEs, and non-SOEs. These results suggest
that the precautionary demand for cash holdings does not change for firms with different
ownership structures.
B. Cash-Cash Flow Sensitivity
The propensity of a firm to save cash from incremental cash flow presents another ap-
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proach for estimating financial constraints (Almeida et al., 2004).27 A positive sensitivity
of cash to cash flow can be seen as evidence of future constraints (e.g., Hadlock and Pierce,
2010; Erel et al., 2015). If the reform relaxes the financial constraints in firms with more
expropriation, then I expect to see significant reductions in cash-cash flow sensitivity for
these companies. I use the following specification to estimate the changes in the cash
to cash flow sensitivity of firms with disparate ownership structures at the time of the
SSSR:
∆
Cashi,j,t
Sizei,j,t
= α0 + β1
CFi,j,t
Sizei,j,t
+ β2
CFi,j,t
Sizei,j,t
∗ Postt + β3Excess ∗ CFi,j,t
Sizei,j,t
∗ Postt
+ β4Excess ∗ CFi,j,t
Sizei,j,t
+ β5Excess ∗ Posti,t + γControls+ αi + αj,t + i,j,t
where fixed effects and other control variables are the same as those in the the cash
holding equation, and the coefficient of interest is the triple interaction term.
The estimates for changes in cash to cash flow sensitivity are presented in the last
three columns of Table 11. The coefficient estimate of Excess ∗ CFi,j,t
Sizei,j,t
∗Postt is negligi-
ble and statistically insignificant, and this finding is consistent among the whole sample,
SOEs, and non-SOEs. These findings imply that the propensity to save cash from incre-
mental cash flow for future investment does not change for firms with disparate ownership
structures.
C. Under-Investment and Free Cash Flow
When firms face financial constraints, they may forgo profitable projects because they
have to use their internal cash flow to fund their investment; thus, a negative cash flow
27Almeida et al. (2004) argue that an increase in cash flow would not affect the investment in un-
constrained firms because they would invest at the first-best level. However, when firms face financial
constraints, they have to prioritize investment and would allocate additional cash flow to expand their
investment. Consequently, cash holdings for future investment may increase along with cash flow in
financially constrained firms.
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shock can cause under-investment. A high under-investment to free cash flow sensitivity
can be used as evidence of financial constraints (Guariglia and Yang, 2016). Therefore,
a declining under-investment to free cash flow sensitivity will implicate easing financial
conditions. The model specification is similar to equation (6) with only one change, that
is, I use under-investment as the dependent variable.
Table C4 reports the findings on under-investment to free cash flow sensitivity for
the subsamples based on the measures of expropriation. The coefficients on free cash
flow are significant across all columns. However, the interaction term is statistically in-
significant for either SOEs or non-SOEs, and for firms with or without excess control,
high or low RPTs, and monitoring intensity. This evidence implies that although firms
have been constrained before, they do not face a significantly easing financial condition
after the announcement. Taken together, I argue that those firms with severe controlling
shareholders’ expropriation do not experience relatively easing financial constraints after
the reform, and these findings are consistent with the alternative indirect measures of
financial condition.
To summarize, I examine financial constraint both through its explicit measures,
namely, cost of debt, cost of equity, cash flow, and growth of external financing, and
three indirect measures. Empirical evidence suggests that even though the reform may
relax financial constraints through lower costs of equity, the effects are similar for firms
with different ownership structures. Stated differently, the declines in ICF sensitivity for
firms suffering greatly from controlling shareholders’ expropriation are caused by their
relatively easing financial conditions.
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1.6.3 Measurement Errors in Investment Opportunities
In principle, investment opportunities can explain a large proportion of the cash flow
effects if Tobin’s Q is a noisy proxy. For example, if Tobin’s Q performs worse for finan-
cially constrained firms, then these firms may obtain a higher ICF sensitivity because
cash flow reflects more information in investment opportunities (Alti, 2003). The SSSR
may affect the measurement errors in Tobin’s Q. This is because before the announce-
ment, the majority shares were non-tradable, thereby creating measurement errors in
estimating the market value and leading to poor performance of Tobin’s Q. However,
this situation is improved after the reform completion because all shares have become
tradable, thereby providing a relatively proper calculation of market value and Tobin’s
Q. Therefore, another alternative explanation for my results can be: if Tobin’s Q is a
noisier proxy for firms with higher expropriation before the announcement and the reform
has alleviated the measurement errors in these firms, then the reform can also lead to
declines in ICF sensitivity.
While I do not know any particular channels of how the SSSR can mitigate measure-
ment errors more profoundly in firms with higher expropriation, and even though my
research design focuses on the difference of coefficients thereby canceling out potential
bias, I want to ensure that this possible argument is not an essential determinant of my
results. I address this concern by applying a standard instrument variable approach. Fol-
lowing Lewellen and Lewellen (2016), I use the beginning-of-period stock returns as an
instrument for investment opportunities based on the assumption that fundamental value
drives stock prices. In addition, I consider the beginning-of-period growth rate of sales
as another instrument in the Chinese context. The first-stage is an over-identification
case where I regress Qt−1 on the beginning-of-period stock returns, beginning-of-period
growth rate of sales, and other control variables. Then, I obtain a fitted value Q∗t−1. In
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the second-stage, I replace Qt−1 with Q∗t−1 for the main regressions in Tables 2, 3, and
4. The idea is that the coefficient of Q∗t−1 in the second-stage reflects the fraction of
cash flow that is uncorrelated with investment opportunities.
The results of the error-corrected model are presented in Table 12. The specifications
follow column (4) of Table 2, column (1) of Table 3, and column (1) of Table 4.The first
two are over-identification, while the last one is exact-identification. Related tests show
that my models pass the weak instrument test and cannot reject the null in the Hansen
J test, thereby implying that the over-identifying restrictions are valid. The estimates
are similar in magnitude and are significant with the findings in Tables 2-4 because my
research design focuses on the differences in ICF sensitivity, thereby canceling out poten-
tial biases to a great extent. Furthermore, I find my findings are robust to other proxy
variables for investment opportunities, namely, beginning-of-period market-to-book ra-
tio, beginning-of-period growth of employment, and the Euler equation specification in
column (6) of Table 2. The evidence supports the view that the measurement errors in
investment opportunities do not seem to cause the declines in ICF sensitivity.
1.7 Conclusions
This paper tests the extent to which the agency-conflict within shareholders drives
ICF sensitivity through controlling shareholders’ expropriation. I exploit a unique policy
reform in China, the SSSR, which aligned the interests of shareholders and exogenously
alleviated the incentives of expropriation from controlling shareholders by converting all
NTS to TS. Chinese listed companies usually have highly concentrated ownership struc-
ture with weak investor protection, thereby facilitating the detection of the impacts of
expropriation on ICF sensitivity. With a generalization of the model in Kaplan and
43
Controlling Shareholders’ Expropriation and the Sensitivity of Investment to Cash Flow Chapter 1
Zingales (1997), I illustrate that controlling shareholders’ expropriation diminishes in-
vestment returns, thereby leading to a relatively high cost-wedge between external and
internal finance. Therefore, firms have to rely more on the low-cost cash flow to invest.
Empirically, I argue that firms with high levels of pre-reform expropriation show signifi-
cant declines in ICF sensitivity, and this finding is more pronounced among private firms.
Furthermore, the findings are robust to alternative measures of expropriation. I also make
considerable efforts to show that alternative explanations, including the managers’ over-
investment, financial constraints, and measurement errors in investment opportunities,
do not seem to drive my findings.
My findings also expand potential research directions. Agency problems lead to
ICF sensitivity through both controlling shareholders’ expropriation and manager’s over-
investment. Further work should try to disentangle the two effects to realize the relative
importance of these channels and should also empirically test the mechanism through
which expropriation leads to ICF sensitivity. Doing so would greatly contribute to our
understanding of how investment depends on cash flow under the agency relationship.
One of the most essential implications from the SSSR is the liquidity of the majority
shares can resolve the agency-conflict in private firms to a great extent. However, given
the difference in state ownership between SOE and non-SOEs, policy makers should con-
tinue searching for the solution to address the different types of agency-conflict in SOEs.
This partially explains why Chinese government pledges to further deepen the reform of
SOEs.
1.8 Tables & Figures
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Table 1: Summary Statistics (1998-2014)
Panel A: Main Regression Variables
Mean SD 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
Before (1998-2003)
Investmentt/Kt−1 0.334 0.507 0.009 0.064 0.175 0.396 1.148
Cash flowt/Kt−1 0.431 0.746 -0.229 0.181 0.313 0.526 1.378
Salet−1/Kt−1 3.093 5.442 0.433 0.977 1.696 3.052 9.139
Tobin’s Qt−1 2.447 1.513 0.822 1.400 2.066 3.078 5.377
Debtt−1/Kt−1 2.554 4.099 0.447 0.970 1.549 2.640 7.270
Casht/Kt−1 1.007 1.811 0.053 0.223 0.477 1.025 3.585
Interest Ratet 0.038 0.119 -0.034 0.026 0.046 0.064 0.116
After (2004-2014)
lnvestmentt/Kt−1 0.318 0.475 0.018 0.082 0.186 0.359 1.006
Cash flowt/Kt−1 0.517 0.895 -0.076 0.185 0.301 0.552 1.699
Salet−1/Kt−1 4.495 7.217 0.485 1.192 2.250 4.549 15.511
Tobin’s Qt−1 1.437 1.275 0.325 0.646 1.067 1.779 3.774
Debtt−1/Kt−1 3.197 5.959 0.451 1.026 1.632 2.961 9.775
Casht/Kt−1 1.178 2.165 0.063 0.225 0.518 1.191 4.131
Interest Ratet 0.051 0.146 -0.047 0.036 0.057 0.080 0.174
Panel B: Pre-Announcement Firm Characteristics (by the end of 2003)
Mean SD 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
RPT/Sales 0.163 0.296 0.000 0.000 0.031 0.186 0.784
Ln(1+RPT) 13.084 7.965 0.000 0.000 17.026 18.618 20.764
Sdummy 0.250 0.433 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000
Excess (p.p.) 3.352 6.982 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.008 20.938
NTS 0.592 0.126 0.362 0.526 0.614 0.679 0.750
SOE 0.751 0.432 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
The sample consists of 15,482 firm-year observations and 1,314 unique firms from
1998 to 2014. Panel A shows the summary statistics for the main regression vari-
ables during the pre- and post- announcement periods, respectively. The main
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to minimize the influence of outliers.
Investment expenditure and cash flow variables are deflated by the beginning-of-
period net fixed capital. Panel B reports the (average) pre-announcement firm
features by the end of 2003, where Excess (p.p.) is measured in terms of percent-
age points. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix Table C1.
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Table 2: Investment-Cash Flow (ICF) Sensitivity and the Reform
Dependent Variable:
Investmentt/Kt−1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CFt/Kt−1 0.268*** 0.330*** 0.209*** 0.273*** 0.190*** 0.260***
(0.016) (0.037) (0.017) (0.032) (0.019) (0.036)
Postt * (CFt/Kt−1) -0.079* -0.080** -0.084**
(0.043) (0.038) (0.040)
Tobin’s Qt−1 0.031*** 0.029*** 0.036*** 0.034***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Salet−1/Kt−1 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.012*** 0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Debtt−1/Kt−1 0.007** 0.008**
(0.003) (0.003)
Itotalt−1/Kt−2 0.379*** 0.380***
(0.031) (0.030)
(Itotalt−1/Kt−2)2 -0.048*** -0.049***
(0.014) (0.014)
Adjusted R2 0.208 0.211 0.235 0.238 0.285 0.288
N 15,482 15,482 15,476 15,476 14,010 14,010
This table presents the estimates of ICF sensitivity during the sample period in columns (1), (3), and
(5), and the effects of the SSSR on ICF sensitivity in columns (2), (4), and (6). All regressions include
year, firm, and (one-digit) industry-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted
for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Postt is an indicator variable that is equal to 1
after the announcement year in 2004, and equal to 0 otherwise. I also include its interaction with cash
flow (CF ) to examine the changes in sensitivities subsequent to the announcement. Columns (5)-(6)
present the findings for the Euler equation model, including the sum of short-term and long-term debts,
beginning-of-period value of investment, and its squared term. Definitions and sources of the other
variables are provided in the Appendix Table C1. *, **, *** indicate significant level at the 10%, 5%,
and 1%, respectively.
46
Controlling Shareholders’ Expropriation and the Sensitivity of Investment to Cash Flow Chapter 1
Table 3: Controlling Shareholders’ Expropriation and ICF Sensitivity: Ownership Struc-
tures
Dependent Variable: Whole Sample Manufacturing Firms Only
Investmentt/Kt−1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CFt/Kt−1 0.217*** 0.223*** 0.167*** 0.213*** 0.212*** 0.152***
(0.038) (0.036) (0.035) (0.052) (0.050) (0.047)
Postt*(CFt/Kt−1) -0.012 -0.017 0.002 -0.003 -0.013 0.004
(0.042) (0.039) (0.038) (0.062) (0.058) (0.054)
Triple1 -0.146** -0.254**
(0.069) (0.110)
Sdummy*(CFt/Kt−1) 0.095* 0.167**
(0.057) (0.084)
Sdummy*Postt 0.016 0.086*
(0.036) (0.047)
Triple2 -0.011** -0.008* -0.020** -0.020**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008)
Excess*(CFt/Kt−1) 0.006 0.005 0.014** 0.014*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
Postt*Excess 0.004 0.003 0.009** 0.009**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
Controls:
Tobin’s Qt−1 0.038*** 0.038*** 0.043*** 0.037*** 0.037*** 0.043***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Salet−1/Kt−1 0.021*** 0.021*** 0.010*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 0.013**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Casht/Kt−1 0.061*** 0.079***
(0.010) (0.014)
Interest Ratet -0.145*** -0.084
(0.052) (0.059)
Adjusted R2 0.242 0.243 0.284 0.219 0.219 0.271
N 10,454 10,454 9,773 6,312 6,312 5,925
This table presents the effects of controlling shareholders’ expropriation (measured with owner-
ship structures) on ICF sensitivity for the whole sample (columns (1)-(3)) and for manufactur-
ing firms only (columns (4)-(6)). All regressions include year, firm, and (one-digit) industry-by-
year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clus-
tered at the firm level. Triple1 stands for Postt*Sdummy*(CFt/Kt−1) and Triple2 stands for
Postt*Excess*(CFt/Kt−1). Postt is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 after the announce-
ment year in 2004, and equal to 0 otherwise. Definitions and sources of the other variables are
provided in the Appendix Table C1. *, **, and *** indicate significant level at the 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.
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Table 5: Controlling Shareholders’ Expropriation and ICF Sensitivity: RPTs
Dependent Variable: Whole Whole Non- Non-
Sample Sample SOE SOE SOE SOE
Investmentt/Kt−1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CFt
Kt−1
0.194*** 0.131*** 0.214*** 0.156*** 0.161** 0.088
(0.037) (0.036) (0.047) (0.055) (0.063) (0.066)
Postt*
CFt
Kt−1
-0.003 0.025 -0.015 0.020 -0.013 0.122
(0.040) (0.040) (0.050) (0.063) (0.072) (0.083)
Triple3 -0.129** -0.142** -0.119 -0.170**
(0.064) (0.065) (0.085) (0.083)
RPTHigh*
CFt
Kt−1
0.125** 0.126** 0.137* 0.123*
(0.055) (0.055) (0.074) (0.064)
RPTHigh*Postt -0.003 0.012 -0.001 -0.007
(0.027) (0.028) (0.033) (0.055)
Triple4 -0.005 -0.012**
(0.005) (0.006)
Ln(1 +RPT )* CFt
Kt−1
0.006 0.005
(0.004) (0.004)
Ln(1 +RPT )*Postt 0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.004)
Controls:
Tobin’s Qt−1 0.036*** 0.040*** 0.031*** 0.041*** 0.036*** 0.042***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010)
Salet−1/Kt−1 0.020*** 0.011*** 0.017*** 0.025*** 0.009*** 0.013**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006)
Casht/Kt−1 0.062*** 0.054*** 0.076***
(0.009) (0.011) (0.014)
Interest Ratet -0.133*** -0.157*** -0.075
(0.043) (0.052) (0.076)
Adjusted R2 0.243 0.280 0.252 0.245 0.279 0.305
N 14,756 13,781 10,963 3,793 10,185 3,596
This table presents the estimates of controlling shareholders’ expropriation (measured with RPTs) on
ICF sensitivity for the whole sample in columns (1)-(2), for SOEs in columns (3) and (5), and for
non-SOEs in columns (4) and (6). The classification of SOEs is based on firm’s ultimate controlling
party in 2003, one year priori to the announcement. All regressions include year, firm, and (one-digit)
industry-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and
clustered at the firm level. Triple3 stands for Postt*RPTHigh*(CFt/Kt−1), and Triple4 stands for
Postt*Ln(1 +RPT )*(CFt/Kt−1). Definitions and sources of the other variables are provided in
the Appendix Table C1. *, **, and *** indicate significant level at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 6: Controlling Shareholders’ Expropriation and ICF Sensitivity: Monitoring In-
tensity
Dependent Variable: High Low High Low
Investmentt/Kt−1 Monitoring Monitoring Monitoring Monitoring
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CFt/Kt−1 0.234*** 0.327*** 0.187*** 0.243***
(0.034) (0.047) (0.033) (0.053)
Postt * (CFt/Kt−1) -0.048 -0.143** -0.031 -0.113*
(0.037) (0.056) (0.035) (0.063)
Controls:
Tobin’s Qt−1 0.031*** 0.039*** 0.036*** 0.040***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010)
Salet−1/Kt−1 0.022*** 0.017*** 0.013*** 0.009**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003)
Casht/Kt−1 0.056*** 0.058***
(0.012) (0.013)
Interest Ratet -0.075 -0.216***
(0.065) (0.055)
Adjusted R2 0.280 0.255 0.316 0.292
N 7,257 7,283 6,843 6,732
This table presents the estimates of controlling shareholders’ expropriation (measured
with monitoring intensity by large shareholders) on ICF sensitivity. I divide the sample
based on the median level of average pre-announcement monitoring. Columns (1) and
(3) report results for the high monitoring (above median) group, while columns (2) and
(4) report the results for the low monitoring (below median) group. All regressions are
estimated with firm, year, (one-digit) industry-by-year, and region-by-year fixed effects.
Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the
firm level. Postt is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 after the announcement year
in 2004, and equal to 0 otherwise. Definitions and sources of the other variables are
provided in the Appendix Table C1. *, **, and *** indicate significant level at the 10%,
5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 7: Endogenous Control
Dependent Variable: CFt/Kt−1 Qt Interest Ratet Casht/Kt−1
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Postt*Excess 0.001 0.001 0.000 -0.003
(0.003) (0.006) (0.001) (0.007)
Control
variables X X X X
Adjusted R2 0.466 0.394 0.034 0.521
N 9,786 9,786 9,786 9,786
This table checks for the endogenous control problem in which the dependent vari-
ables are cash flow in column (1), Tobin’s Q in column (2), interest rate in column
(3), and cash holdings in column (4). All regressions are estimated with firm, year,
and (one-digit) industry-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are
adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Postt is an indicator
variable that is equal to 1 after the announcement year in 2004, and equal to 0
otherwise. I include its interaction with Excess to examine different changes in the
dependent variable for firms with high or low excess control rights subsequent to
the announcement. Control variables are the rest of controls in the main regression
(other than the depend variable itself). I omit the coefficients of these control vari-
ables to save space. Definitions and sources of the other variables are provided in
the Appendix Table C1. *, **, *** indicate significant level at the 10%, 5%, and
1%, respectively.
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Table 8: Over-Investment and Free Cash Flow
Panel A: Manager’s Over-Investment of Free Cash Flow
Dependent Variable: Whole Sample State Ownership Whole Sample
Over-Investmentt/aveSizet SOE non-SOE OverInv
U.S.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
FCFt/aveSizet 0.084*** 0.093*** 0.043
(0.019) (0.022) (0.050)
Postt * (FCFt/aveSizet) -0.048** -0.064*** 0.008
(0.021) (0.024) (0.053)
FCFU.S.t /aveSizet 0.403***
(0.050)
Postt * (FCF
U.S.
t /aveSizet) -0.250***
(0.052)
Adjusted R2 0.342 0.335 0.380 0.233
N 7,367 5,448 1,919 2,083
Panel B: Within-Sample Comparison
Dependent Variable: Separation RPT Monitoring
Over-Investmentt/aveSizet Yes No High Low High Low
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FCFt/aveSizet 0.131*** 0.083*** 0.071** 0.094*** 0.101*** 0.079***
(0.038) (0.026) (0.031) (0.025) (0.027) (0.025)
Postt * (FCFt/aveSizet) -0.066 -0.055* -0.048 -0.044 -0.064** -0.049*
(0.044) (0.028) (0.033) (0.029) (0.031) (0.028)
Adjusted R2 0.505 0.292 0.351 0.349 0.355 0.350
N 1,447 4,354 3,381 3,627 3,360 3,535
Over-investmentt and FCFt are estimated from column (1) of Table C3 with post-announcement data. Over-
investmentU.S.t and FCF
U.S.
t are calculated with the U.S. coefficients in column (2) of Table C3. All regressions
include firm, year, and industry-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for het-
eroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate significant level at the 10%, 5%, and 1%,
respectively.
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Table 9: Controlling Shareholders’ Expropriation and ICF Sensitivity: Likelihood of
Over-Investment
Dependent Variable: High Cash Low Cash High Low
Investmentt/Kt−1 Holdings Holdings Leverage Leverage
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CFt/Kt−1 0.161*** 0.171*** 0.084** 0.328***
(0.055) (0.044) (0.039) (0.071)
Postt * (CFt/Kt−1) 0.030 -0.022 0.067 -0.121*
(0.053) (0.048) (0.044) (0.073)
Postt*Excess*(CFt/Kt−1) -0.005 -0.013 -0.013** -0.002
(0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007)
Excess*(CFt/Kt−1) 0.004 0.006 0.007* 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Postt*Excess 0.001 0.004 0.007** -0.004
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Controls:
Tobin’s Qt−1 0.038*** 0.048*** 0.051*** 0.025**
(0.011) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010)
Salet−1/Kt−1 0.008 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.004
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Casht−1/Kt−1 0.063*** 0.064*** 0.053*** 0.066***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.015)
Interest Ratet -0.134** -0.163** -0.203** -0.114*
(0.068) (0.082) (0.088) (0.061)
Adjusted R2 0.304 0.273 0.285 0.309
N 4,686 5,076 5,039 4,723
This table presents the estimates of controlling shareholders’ expropriation (measured with
excess control) on ICF sensitivity for firms with different likelihoods of over-investment.
I divide the sample based on the median level of the average pre-announcement cash
holdings and leverage ratio. Cash holding is cash and cash equivalents divided by total
assets, and leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. Columns (1) and (4) report
outcomes for firms with higher probability of over-investment (above median cash holdings
and below median leverage ratio), while columns (2) and (3) report outcomes for firms
less likely to over-investing. All regressions include firm, year, and industry-by-year fixed
effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered
at the firm level. Postt is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 after the announcement
year in 2004, and equal to 0 otherwise. Definitions and sources of the other variables are
provided in the Appendix Table C1. *, **, and *** indicate significant level at the 10%,
5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 10: Cumulative Abnormal Return Around Policy Announcement
(1) (2) (3)
CAR[-1,+1] CAR[-2,+2] CAR[-5,+5]
SOE Non-SOE SOE Non-SOE SOE Non-SOE
Sdummy = 1 0.016*** 0.020*** 0.029*** 0.031*** 0.040*** 0.055***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.010) (0.008)
Sdummy = 0 0.012*** 0.019*** 0.014*** 0.029*** 0.021*** 0.056***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.008)
Difference1−0 0.004 0.001 0.015 0.002 0.019 -0.001
N 538 194 538 194 538 194
RPTHigh = 1 0.010*** 0.022*** 0.013*** 0.036*** 0.018*** 0.060***
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007)
RPTHigh = 0 0.015*** 0.019*** 0.023*** 0.028*** 0.035*** 0.051***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)
Difference1−0 -0.005 0.003 -0.010 0.008 -0.017* 0.009
N 747 250 747 250 747 250
This table presents a univariate test of cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) around the pol-
icy announcement date for SOEs and private firms based on pre-reform controlling sharehold-
ers’ excess control and RPTs. Sdummy = 1 represents the firms with excess control, while
Sdummy = 0 represents the firms without excess control. RPTHigh = 1 represents the firms
with above median pre-announcement RPT, while RPTHigh = 0 represents the firms with below
median. Robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Difference1− 0 reports the T-test
results for the difference in means. The SSSR announcement was on 1/31/2004 (Saturday),
and the event-date was the following Monday (2/2/2004). I use the composite index for all
A-shares as the proxy for market returns. The number of observations in SOEs (non-SOEs)
with Sdummy = 1 is 84 (118) and Sdummy = 0 is 454 (76). The number of observations in
SOEs (non-SOEs) with RPTHigh = 1 is 392 (122) and RPTHigh = 1 is 355 (158). *, **, ***
indicate significant level at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 11: Indirect Measurement of Financial Constraints: Cash Holdings and Cash-Cash
Flow Sensitivity
Dependent Variable: Casht/Sizet ∆(Casht/Sizet)
Whole SOE non-SOE Whole SOE non-SOE
Sample Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CFt/Sizet 0.181*** 0.158*** 0.232*** 0.167*** 0.132*** 0.237***
(0.022) (0.025) (0.043) (0.028) (0.032) (0.057)
Postt 0.024 -0.091 0.041
(0.070) (0.132) (0.172)
Postt*CFt/Sizet -0.026 -0.019 -0.011
(0.031) (0.035) (0.065)
Postt*Excess*(CFt/Sizet) 0.003 0.004 -0.002
(0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Excess*(CFt/Sizet) 0.000 -0.000 -0.001
(0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
Postt*Excess -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001* -0.001* 0.000
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
Controls:
Leveraget -0.072*** -0.071*** -0.073*** -0.080*** -0.087*** -0.077***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.013) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010)
LnSizet -0.029 -0.027 -0.120 -0.120*** -0.100*** -0.158***
(0.054) (0.067) (0.107) (0.026) (0.031) (0.058)
Ln(Size)2t 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Sales Growtht 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.003 0.002 0.005** -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Adjusted R2 0.103 0.095 0.131 0.104 0.095 0.134
N 10,529 7,852 2,677 10,529 7,852 2,677
This table presents the estimates of equations in which the dependent variables are the firms’ cash holdings to total
assets in columns (1)-(3) and the changes in the ratio of the firms’ cash holdings to total assets in columns (4)-(6).
Columns (1) and (4) report outcomes for the whole sample, columns (2) and (5) report for SOEs, and columns (3) and
(6) reports for non-SOEs. The classification of SOEs is based on firm’s ultimate controlling party in 2003, one year
prior to the announcement. All regressions include year, firm, and (one-digit) industry-by-year fixed effects. Standard
errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. Postt is an indicator variable
that is equal to 1 after the announcement year in 2004, and equal to 0 otherwise. Leverage is the ratio of total debt
to total assets; LnSize is the log of total assets; and Sales Growth is the growth rate of real sales. Definitions and
sources of the other variables are provided in the Appendix Table C1. *, **, *** indicate significant level at the 10%,
5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 12: Correction for Measurement Errors in Investment Opportunities
Dependent Variable: (1) (2) (3)
Investmentt/Kt−1 IVs: Stock Returnt−1 IV: Stock Returnt−1 IVs: Stock Returnt−1
Sales Growtht−1 Sales Growtht−1
Q*t−1 0.040*** 0.034** 0.043***
(0.012) (0.016) (0.012)
CFt/Kt−1 0.270*** 0.224*** 0.192***
(0.032) (0.037) (0.037)
Postt * (CFt/Kt−1) -0.078** -0.016 -0.002
(0.038) (0.038) (0.040)
Postt*Sdummy*(CFt/Kt−1) -0.011**
(0.005)
Excess*(CFt/Kt−1) 0.006
(0.004)
Excess*Postt 0.003
(0.003)
Postt*RPTHigh*(CFt/Kt−1) -0.128**
(0.063)
RPTHigh*(CFt/Kt−1) 0.124**
(0.054)
RPTHigh*Postt -0.005
(0.027)
Salet−1/Kt−1 0.020*** 0.021*** 0.020***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.126 0.164
Adjusted R2 0.166 0.179 0.176
N 15,413 10,424 14,721
This table presents the estimates of the equation in which I address the measurement errors in Tobin’s Q with
instrument variable approach. The instruments are the beginning-of-period sales growth and stock return in columns
(1) and (3) and the beginning-of-period stock return in column (2). The regression specifications follow column (4)
in Table 2, column (2) in Table 3, and column (1) in Table 5. All regressions are estimated with firm, year, and
industry-by-year fixed effects. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered at the firm level. Q*t−1 represents
investment opportunities after correcting measurement errors. Postt is an indicator variable that is equal to 1 after
the announcement year in 2004, and equal to 0 otherwise. The results of Hansen J tests for over-identification are also
included. Definitions and sources of the other variables are provided in the Appendix Table C1. *, **, *** indicate
significant level at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Figure 1: Graphic Explanation for Proposition 2
This figure provides a graphical explanation for Proposition 2, where the x-axis represents investment
and cash flow, while the y-axis represents the marginal cost of external finance C ′, and marginal return
to investment F ′.
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Figure 2: Graphic Explanation for Proposition 3 (Condition c)
This figure provides a graphical explanation for Proposition 3 under the third set of sufficient condition
(C(E) is quadratic and F ′′′(.) <)0), where the x-axis represents investment and cash flow, while the
y-axis represents the marginal cost of external finance C ′, and marginal return to investment F ′.
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Figure 3: Parallel Trend (Excess Control)
(a) Whole Sample
(b) Manufacturing Firms Only
The figures plot the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from an event-study regression that com-
pares ICF sensitivity in each year for firms with and without excess control. Figure 3(a) is for the whole
sample and Figure 3(b) is for manufacturing firms only. The omitted year is 2014, and the vertical lines
represent the announcement of the SSSR.
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Figure 4: Parallel Trend (RPTs)
This figure plots the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from an event-study regression that com-
pares ICF sensitivity in each year for firms with high and low related-party transactions. The omitted
year is 2014, and the vertical line represents the announcement of the SSSR.
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Figure 5: New External Financing
This figure plots new issue activity. New debt refers to the aggregate change in total debt, scaled by
total assets. New equity is the aggregate change in total equity (the sum of common stock and capital
surplus), scaled by total assets. New debt and New equity are constructed from the CSMAR dataset
using all non-financial firms between 1998 and 2014. The vertical line represents the announcement of
the SSSR.
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1.9 Appendix
A. Proof of Propositions
Proof for Proposition 1
For notational ease, I denote the optimal choice of the controlling shareholder (man-
ager) as α∗ (I∗). The first order condition from Equation (1) shows:
cα(k, α
∗) = 1 (A1)
Differentiating the first order condition with respect to k, I get:
dα∗
dk
= − ckα(k, α)
cαα(k, α)
< 0 (A2)
Proof for Proposition 2
According to Equation (2), the first-order optimality condition shows that the optimal
investment level I∗ must satisfy:
(1− α)F ′(I∗) = 1 + C ′(I∗ −W ) (A3)
Implicit differentiation with respect to W yields:
(1− α)F ′′(I∗) dI
∗
dW
= C ′′(I∗ −W )[ dI
∗
dW
− 1]⇔ dI
∗
dW
=
C ′′(I∗ −W )
C ′′(I∗ −W )− (1− α)F ′′(I∗)
(A4)
Therefore, dI
∗
dW
> 0 given C ′′ > 0 and F ′′ < 0. Q.E.D.
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Proof for Proposition 3
For Equation (A3), implicit differentiation with respect to α yields:
−F ′(I∗) + (1− α)F ′′(I∗)dI
∗
dα
= C ′′(I∗ −W )dI
∗
dα
⇔ dI
∗
dα
=
−F ′(I∗)
C ′′(I∗ −W )− (1− α)F ′′(I∗)
(A5)
From (A4) and (A5), I get that:
d
dα
[
dI∗
dW
] =
−C ′′(I∗ −W )F ′′(I∗)
(C ′′(I∗ −W )− (1− α)F ′′(I∗))2
− C
′′′(I∗ −W )
C ′′(I∗ −W )− (1− α)F ′′(I∗)(
F ′(I∗)
C ′′(I∗ −W )− (1− α)F ′′(I∗))
+
C ′′(I∗ −W )(C ′′′(I∗ −W )− (1− α)F ′′′(I∗))
(C ′′(I∗ −W )− (1− α)F ′′(I∗))2 (
F ′(I∗)
C ′′(I∗ −W )− (1− α)F ′′(I∗))
∝ −C ′′(I∗ −W )F ′′(I∗)− F ′(I∗)C ′′′(I∗ −W )
+
C ′′(I∗ −W )F ′(I∗)(C ′′′(I∗ −W ))− (1− α)F ′′′(I∗))
C ′′(I∗ −W )− (1− α)F ′′(I∗)
= −C ′′(I∗ −W )F ′′(I∗) + (1− α)F
′(I∗)[C ′′′(I∗ −W )F ′′(I∗)− C ′′(I∗ −W )F ′′′(I∗)]
C ′′(I∗ −W )− (1− α)F ′′(I∗)
Therefore, d
dα
[ dI
∗
dW
] > 0, if C ′′(I∗ −W )F ′′′(I∗) ≤ C ′′′(I∗ −W )F ′′(I∗), or equivalently if
C′′′(I∗−W )
C′′(I∗−W ) ≤ F
′′′(I∗)
F ′′(I∗) . This is true when either set of the sufficient conditions is satisfied,
namely, F (I) and C(E) are quadratic functions, F ′′′(I) < 0 and C(E) is a quadratic
function, F (I) is a quadratic function and C ′′′(E) < 0, or F ′′′(I) < 0 and C ′′′(E) < 0.
Proof for Proposition 4
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d
dk
[
dI∗
dW
] =
d
dα
[
dI∗
dW
] ∗ dα
dk
(A6)
B. Measurement of Over-Investment
I decompose total investment (Itotal) into three parts: expected or optimal investment,
unexpected investment, and investment for maintenance. First, investment expenditures
on new projects (Inew) are computed as the total investment (Itotal) minus investment
for maintenance (Imain). Second, to adjust dynamic panel bias, I apply a system-GMM
approach to estimate the fitted value of the following equation as the optimal investment
(Ienew), namely, the investment in projects with positive net present value:
Inewi,j,t = α0 + β1Inewi,j,t−1 + β2Cashi,j,t−1 + β3Qi,j,t−1 + β4Sizei,j,t−1 + β5Agei,j,t
+ β6ROAi,j,t−1 + β7Debti,j,t−1 + β8StockReturnsi,j,t−1 + αi + αj,t + i,j,t
where i, t, and j denote firm, year, and industry, respectively. All variables, except
for Q, ROA, and Stock Return, are scaled by average total assets. The unexpected in-
vestment (Iunew) is the residual component (Inew − Ienew). A positive (negative) residual
component represents over-investment (under-investment). Table C2 in the Appendix
reports the estimation of this equation using system-GMM (Blundell and Bond, 1998).
In column (1), I estimate the coefficients only based on post-announcement data to ob-
tain a relatively accurate measurement of the “optimal” investment.28 In column (2), I
show the coefficients in the U.S. between 1988 and 2002 from the findings in Richardson
28I drop pre-reform observations because they involve more severe agency costs and would largely bias
the estimation. Admittedly, the reform might not be able to eliminate all agency problems. But using
the post-reform data when the major agency-conflict is alleviated can generate less bias.
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(2006).29 These coefficients may suffer from less bias for calculating the “optimal” invest-
ment because the U.S. is a more developed market than China with better shareholder
protection and a more mature professional market for managers.
In addition, free cash flow (FCF ) is obtained by subtracting optimal investment
(Ienew) and investment for maintenance (Imain) from net cash flow from operating activi-
ties (CFO).
C. Tables
29Firms in a less developed market may make investment decisions based on return on assets (ROA)
instead of stock returns (Guariglia and Yang, 2016). In addition, Richardson (2006) constructs V/P,
which represents the book value of the firm divided by the market value of equity, as a measurement
for the growth opportunity of U.S. firms. However, the parameters for calculating V/P may not be
applicable to Chinese firms. Thus, I use ROA and Tobin’s Q instead in my specification.
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Table C1: Variable Definition
Variable Definitions
Age Number of years since listing
Cash Cash and cash equivalents
CF Cash flow, i.e., earnings before interest, tax, depreciation
and amortization (EBITDA)
Debt Sum of short-term and long-term debt
Excess Cash flow rights subtracted from control rights
of the controlling shareholders
Interest Rate Financial expenses over interest carrying liabilities
Investment Capital expenditures, i.e. cash paid to acquire and construct
fixed assets, intangible assets and other long-term assets
K Net fixed capital
Ln(1 +RPT ) Logarithm of average pre-reform amount of related-party
transactions between listed company and the parent company
LnSize Natural logarithm of average total assets
Leverage The ratio of total debt to total assets
Monitoring Sum of shares held by the second to the fifth largest shareholders
(as a percentage of total shares), multiplying a Herfindahl index
for the concentration of shares, averaging over pre-reform period
NTS Fraction of non-tradable share
ROA Return on asset, i.e. ratio of net income to total assets
RPTHigh A dummy variable equal to 1 if the average pre-reform
related-party transactions scaled by total sales is above its median
Sale Main operating income
Sales Growth Growth rate of real main operating income
Sdummy A dummy equal to 1 if the control rights of the largest shareholder
exceed the cash-flow rights
SOE State-owned enterprises, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm’s
ultimate controller is the state
Tobin′sQ Ratio of market value to book value of assets, where market value of
assets is market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities
Industry classification: Farming, forestry, animal husbandry & fishing; Mining; Manufacturing; Util-
ities; Construction; Transportation & warehouse; Information technology; Wholesale & Retailing;
Real estate; Social services; Communications & Cultural; Conglomerates; Finance and insurance.
Following previous studies, I exclude Finance and insurance, and Real estate sectors.
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Table C2: Estimation of Optimal Investment
Dependent Variable: (1) (2)
Inewi,t Post-Announcement U.S. Coefficients
Inewi,t−1 0.405*** 0.386***
(0.037)
Cashi,t−1 0.017 0.104***
(0.038)
log Sizei,t−1 -0.003 0.003***
(0.005)
Agei,t -0.001 -0.006***
(0.003)
Leveragei,t−1 -0.038 -0.049***
(0.031)
Tobin’s Qi,t−1 0.002
(0.003)
ROAi,t−1 0.152**
(0.068)
Stock Returni,t−1 0.010***
Growth opportunityi,t−1 -0.013***
Hansen J test (p-value) 0.162
m3 test (p-value) 0.344
N 9,840 58,053
In column (1), this table presents the estimates of the optimal investment
coefficients using post-announcement data. Column (2) presents the
coefficients in Richardson (2006). Test statistics and standard errors (in
parentheses) of all variables in the regressions are asymptotically robust
to heteroscedasticity. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level.
The dependent variable is Inewi,t , the new investment expenditure. All
variables except Tobin’s Qi,t−1, Sizei,t−1 and Agei,t are scaled by average
total assets. For the system-GMM regression, m3 is a test for third-order
autocorrelation of the differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as
N(0,1) under the null hypothesis of no serial correlation. The Hansen J test
of over-identifying restrictions is distributed as Chi-square under the null of
instrument validity. I treat the beginning-of-period new investment, cash,
Tobin’s Q, Size, ROA and leverage as potentially endogenous variables;
levels of these variables dated t-3 and further are used as instruments in
the first-differenced equations and first-differences of these same variables
lagged twice are used as additional instruments in the level equations. *,
**, *** indicate significant level at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table C3: Summary Statistics: Abnormal Investment and Free Cash Flow
Mean SD 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
Before (1998-2003)
lnvestmentt/aveSizet 0.058 0.061 0.000 0.015 0.040 0.081 0.188
New investmentt/aveSizet 0.032 0.058 -0.030 -0.005 0.016 0.052 0.160
Optimal investmentt/aveSizet 0.008 0.106 -0.134 -0.043 0.005 0.056 0.162
Unexpected investmentt/aveSizet 0.024 0.114 -0.148 -0.031 0.025 0.082 0.191
Free cash flowt/aveSizet 0.020 0.126 -0.173 -0.044 0.026 0.089 0.203
After (2004-2014)
lnvestmentt/aveSizet 0.058 0.060 0.001 0.016 0.040 0.081 0.181
New investmentt/aveSizet 0.032 0.058 -0.032 -0.003 0.017 0.053 0.148
Optimal investmentt/aveSizet 0.007 0.065 -0.098 -0.032 0.009 0.049 0.108
Unexpected investmentt/aveSizet 0.025 0.075 -0.082 -0.024 0.018 0.066 0.155
Free cash flowt/aveSizet 0.024 0.094 -0.126 -0.034 0.020 0.079 0.183
All variables are estimated with coefficients from column (1) of Table C2. Summary statistics show
separately for before and after reform period. Investment and cash flow variables are deflated by
average total assets. Investment is total capital expenditures. New investment is (total) investment
less investment for maintenance. Optimal investment is investment expenditure in projects generating
positive net present value. Unexpected investment is abnormal investment expenditure, which is new
investment minus optimal investment. Free cash flow is subtracting investment for maintenance and
optimal investment from net cash flow from operating. Those variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%
to minimize the influence of outliers.
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Chapter 2
Does Investment-cash Flow
Sensitivity Measure Financial
Constraints? Evidence from
Industrial Regulation in China
2.1 Introduction
In perfect capital markets, investment should only depend on a firm’s investment
opportunities and not on its financing structure (Modigliani and Miller, 1958). However,
empirical findings indicate a significant and positive correlation between investment and
cash flow, after controlling for growth opportunities. Fazzari et al. (1988) (hereafter,
FHP, 1988) initially argue that this can be explained by financial constraints because of
the increased costs of acquiring external finance that drive firms to complete investments
based on their internal cash flow.1 However, the literature raises considerable debate on
the relationship between investment-cash flow sensitivity (ICFS) measure and financial
constraints. The non-consensus on the interpretation originates from the proxy used for
1They discuss the sensitivity of firms’ investment to fluctuations in internal funds for U.S. manufac-
turing firms. The main idea is to introduce a measure of financial constraints because their empirical
results confirm that more constrained firms have investments that are more sensitive to cash flows than
less constrained firms.
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financial constraints, such as that in Kaplan and Zingales (1997) (hereafter, KZ, 1997).2
Many scholars have also challenged the financial constraints view. Thus, whether ICFS
is a good indicator for financial constraints remains controversial.
By building on a staggered industrial regulation for 23 industries with backward pro-
duction capacity and over-capacity in China, we extend the study on ICFS in the con-
text of emerging markets and find evidence supporting FHP’s view. The policy restricts
the accessibility to bank loans for firms that operate in regulated industries, thereby
serving as an exogenous shock of increasing external finance costs. Using a difference-
in-differences approach, we examine the change of ICFS by exploiting this variation in
financing costs and find that firms in treated industries show a 7.6% increase in the sen-
sitivity. Our results robustly confirm the view that ICFS effectively indicates financial
constraints.
Previous studies have shown that state ownership is an essential force in scare re-
source allocation and note that state-owned enterprise (SOEs) often enjoy preferential
treatment ( “soft-budget constraints”) from the government regardless of their perfor-
mance, such as lower cost of credit and land endowment (e.g., Gugler, 2003). By removing
the previous “helping hand” of the government, we predict that the regulated SOEs would
suffer more from tightening financial constraints. Consistent with our expectation, we
find that SOEs exhibit significantly higher ICFS than private companies. Moreover, we
empirically support the political favoritism argument by showing that SOEs experience
economically and statistically significant losses in loans. Our further analyses on the
effect of prior credit dependence provide analogous evidences that ICFS increments after
industrial regulation are larger for firms with higher levels of credit dependence than their
2They question the financial constraints proxy and disagree with the interpretation of the sensitivity
measure. They criticize that a firm’s dividend ratio is an endogenous firm-level choice and an imperfect
sorting mechanism; instead, they collect the quantitative and qualitative information from the annual
reports to classify financial conditions.
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counterparts.3 Relative to the rich variations in macroeconomic conditions in China, the
impact of industrial regulation on ICFS can be exacerbated during the world financial
crisis and moderated during the credit expansion in China.
We also conduct a battery of ancillary tests to verify the robustness of our findings.
First, although the results are consistent with the view that ICFS measures financial
constraints, the regulation might also affect cash flow and/or investment opportunities.
In such cases, changes in control variables could also increase ICFS. We test this finding
by checking for the endogenous control problem of cash flow and Tobin’s Q. Second, we
employ a propensity score matching method to further address the concern of endogenous
selection in the treatment group. We create a paired-sample by matching main finan-
cial variables based on one-year prior to the regulation in treatment and control groups.
Third, we use an alternative classification standard to define regulated firms. Finally,
we conduct a set of placebo tests by changing treatment time, randomly varying the
treatment group, and replacing the dependent variable with another irrelevant variable.
Overall, the robustness check and placebo tests can rule out alternative explanations and
support the notion that increases in ICFS are driven by the exogenous loss of loans.
This paper adds to the continued discussion on the association between financial con-
straints and ICFS. Starting from the debate between FHP (1988) and KZ (1997), many
scholars have examined the interpretation of ICFS.4 Empirically, many later studies have
3The results are robust when using the fraction of loans in total external finance, and when using
interest rates to approximate credit-dependence.
4For example, some studies are concerned with measurement errors in investment opportunities, in
which the positive ICFS is merely attributed to cash flow containing information of investment oppor-
tunities (see e.g. Erickson and Whited, 2000; Erickson and Whited, 2012; Alti, 2003). Gomes (2001)’s
model predicts that cash flow sensitivities can be derived even without any settings on financial con-
straints and Moyen (2004) builds an unconstrained model and a constrained model to rationalize the
empirical dispute between FHP (1988) and KZ (1997). While Hadlock and Pierce (2010) find that ICFS
is not monotonically increasing in a firm’s level of financial constraints based on their own measure,
which is in line with the conclusions in KZ (1997). Chen and Chen (2012) study ICFS and find that
it cannot effectively measure financial constraints because the number declines over time and is almost
zero during the recent credit crunch.
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used the estimated ICFS as their main measure of financial constraints, such as Erel et al.
(2015). These studies have mainly focused on well-developed financial markets, whereas
few studies have included emerging markets in which the financing condition is different
(e.g., the restricted availability of external finance).5 In such cases, implications from
the developed markets might not always hold in these emerging countries. Our work is
among the first to test whether ICFS measures financial constraints in the context of
emerging markets.
We also contribute to the understanding of the causal effect of financial constricts on
ICFS with a natural experiment during which firms experience an unexpected, exogenous,
and substantial increase in cost of external financing. The literature using identification
strategies to test the validity of measures for financial constraints is increasing because
indicators of financial constraints are usually an endogenous choices, such as cash hold-
ings and dividend ratios.6 Moreover, our empirical results can tackle endogeneity because
the identification design focuses on the difference of coefficients, thereby cancelling the
potential bias that arises from measurement errors in investment opportunities, which is
a standard critique in the context of ICFS (see e.g. Erickson and Whited, 2000; Alti,
2003).
Finally, our results provide a novel perspective to examine the economic consequences
of government intervention on corporate activities. Previous studies have mainly argued
5An emerging market, like China, which is a typically bank-dependent financing economy, has been
criticized for underdeveloped capital markets with higher costs of information production and dissem-
ination. For instance, referring to the total social financing statistics released by the People’s Bank
of China, by the end of 2016, CNY loans from the banking system accounts for 67.4%, whereas the
corporate bond market only reaches 11.5% of total social financing.
6Andre´n and Jankensg˚ard (2015) use a positive oil price shock as an exogenous decline of financing
costs for companies in the U.S. oil and gas industry. Chowdhury et al. (2016) consider two exogenous
shocks to firms’ information asymmetry as indicators of the changing cost of external finance. Both of
them conclude that ICFS is an effective indicator of financial constraints. More broadly, Farre-Mensa
and Ljungqvist (2016) use 43 staggered increases in corporate income taxes as an exogenous increase in
cost of financing and argue that constrained firms do not behave like they were constrained.
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that government intervention may distort efficient resources allocation.7 Our study ana-
lyzes the effects of the industrial regulation itself and also sheds light on the heterogeneous
effects between SOE and non-SOEs. Futhermore, over-capacity and outdated capacity
represent important global issues that affects not only China’s economy, but also that
of other countries via exports and outward foreign direct investments. However, related
literature has remained lacking when evaluating the performance of the regulation using
micro-level data. By contrast, many studies have focused on aggregated data, descriptive
analysis, or capacity measurement (Shen and Chen, 2017).
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the institutional background of
the industrial regulation and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data, vari-
ables, and summary statistics. Section 4 presents the main findings with the difference-
in-differences approach. Section 5 discusses heterogeneity via within-sample comparison.
Section 6 shows robustness analysis, and finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
Introduction
2.2 Institutional Background and Hypotheses Devel-
opment
2.2.1 Institutional Background
Over-capacity and outdated (backward production) capacity are important phenom-
ena that emerged in certain industries during China’s recent economic development.
Several recent rounds of economic stimulus plans are enacted by central and local govern-
7For instance, Li et al. (2008) provide evidence on the beneficial impact of political connections to the
performance of private entrepreneurs and reveal the underlying mechanism that private entrepreneurs
with political capital can easily obtain loans from banks or other state institutions, and afford them
more confidence in the legal system. By contrast, Chen et al. (2011) find that government intervention
in SOEs distorts investment behavior and harms investment efficiency in China.
74
Does Investment-cash Flow Sensitivity Measure Financial Constraints? Evidence from Industrial
Regulation in China Chapter 2
ments, providing a strongly irrational incentive for “hot money” flows into government-
targeted sectors. Given these large-scale investments in prior years, the production ca-
pacity of many industries remains a rapid growth process. As a response to the central
call, China equipped companies that operate in the favored industries with grants, low-
interest loans, cheap energy and other raw materials, and even free land resources. In
particular, over-capacity industries mainly include ironmaking and steel making, solar
panel manufacturing, coal, shipbuilding, aluminum and concrete, whereas outdated ca-
pacity industries include not only these over-capacity ones, but also other sectors, such as
heavy chemical industry and etc. Under such intervention, these sectors grow rapidly and
significantly expanded in production capacity despite their inefficient production tech-
nologies. For example, as reported by the China Steel Year Book, the total production of
crude steel in 2004 amounted to 340.1 million tons, which increased to 610.3 million tons
in 2007, thereby suggesting that the total production nearly doubled within 3 years. The
average annual growth rate is roughly 21.5%. Compared with the number released in
World-steel’s Steel Statistical Yearbook, in 2004, China’s crude steel production amount
contributed to 25.7% of the global production, and in 2007, the percentage increased to
36.3%. This number exceeded 50% in recent years continuously, which indicates that over
half of the total production of crude steel in the world is provided by China. Meanwhile,
the total investment of fixed assets in the iron and steel industries increased dramatically
from 145.3 billion CNY in 2003 to 509.9 billion CNY in 2013, with an average annual
growth rate of 13.4%.
Furthermore, local governments aim to promote economic development growth and
maintain regional social stability, and hope to elicit key investment and stabilize job
positions via these industries, whereas their products may have a high degree of homoge-
nization. Over-capacity is not limited to traditional industries. Emerging sectors such as
the photovoltaic and wind turbine manufacturing industries have also faced with excess
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capacity issues because these strategic emerging industries did enjoy excess preferential
policies from local governments.
Given the slowdown of China’s economic growth and the sluggish demand abroad
for exports, the prices of products and services went down, the profit margin of indus-
trial enterprises above fell significantly, the number of loss-making enterprises gradually
increased, and the scope and severity of over- and outdated capacity further expanded.
Moreover, the low-efficiency enterprises that previously enjoyed preferential policies and
regional protection from the government are reluctant to withdraw from the market-
ordinated competition, thereby significantly crowding out the top-quality enterprises.8
Within a short period, these enterprises that operated in over-capacity and outdated
industries can smoothen and internalize the potential operating risk. However, such
practice can only mask these socio-economic risks for a short time, but the operational
risks of enterprises continue to accumulate.
To avoid the risk of a “hard landing” for China’s economy, the State Council issued
“Instructions on Tackling the Problem of Excess Over-capacity and Eliminations of Out-
dated Industries”. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) made
staggered efforts to gradually strict control over the added capacity in order to avoid a
new round of gluts and included more industries to the list of sectors, which is aim to
curb production. The regulators are targeting the following energy-intensive and highly
pollution industries to curb over-capacity and outdated capacity (based on four-digit
industrial codes): coking, calcium carbide, ferroalloy, cement manufacturing, paper mak-
ing, plate glass, ironmaking and steelmaking, electrolytic aluminum, coal, monosodium
glutamate, citric acid, dyeing and textile, tanning, chemical fiber, copper, lead and zinc
8According to a document released in government’s websites, in Shanxi province, China’s top coal-
producing region, the government told financial institutions to maintain coal sector lending at least on
last year’s levels, increase awareness of the industry’s “pillar and strategic status” and not recall loans
to seven local government-owned coal groups (an average liability-to-asset ratio of roughly 83%).
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smelting, electricity, lead storage battery, and shipbuilding. Table 1 lists the specific
timetables for the regulated industries. All industries in Table 1 have backward produc-
tion capacity and the six bolded ones are over-capacity industries. The regulators drafted
and released the name lists of affected industries and enforced the guidelines of clearing
out the over-capacity and outdated industries.
In accordance to a guiding statement on how to resolve China’s over-capacity in a
number of outdated industries, central ministries and offices must instruct their provincial
and local-level offices to conduct policies accordingly. If enterprises do not comply with
the local restrictions, then local banks and financial institutions must deny the enter-
prises’ access to new loans, lines of credit, and other financial assistance. China’s banks
have been ordered to slash lending to loss-making and delinquent corporate borrowers.
Similarly, local offices of the Ministry of Land and Resources may not approve additional
requests for new land permits from noncompliant enterprises. In extreme cases, local
regulators must cut companies’ power supplies. Furthermore, the government should call
off unfair preferential policies in whatever regions and industries so as to promote fair
competition through which good enterprises stand out, whereas those that lack in com-
petitiveness are sifted out. Moreover, substantial efforts should be enforced to improve
and implement the policy issued by leaders to “digest, transfer, integrate, and obsolete
a batch of excess capacities”.
Therefore, these industry policy adjustments provide an ideal setting for staggered
regulation shock in specific industries, especially in terms of the accessibility of government-
favored resources such as credit. Intuitively, we believe that firms operating in these
treated industries will face severe financial constraints.
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2.2.2 Hypotheses Development
Prior studies (i.e., FHP, 1988) on ICFS have interpreted the positive coefficient es-
timated from regressing investment on cash flow after controlling for the investment
opportunities of Tobin’s Q as financial constraints. They posit that the sensitivity of
investment to internal funds should increase with the wedge between the costs of internal
and external funds. However, the followed research has raises a debate on this interpre-
tation with their models and empirical evidence (i.e., KZ, 1997; Gomes, 2001; Chen and
Chen, 2012).
In this section, we develop our testable hypotheses, which further concern the empir-
ically interprets ICFS by exploring the recent industry policy adjustment in China. As
reviewed in the last section, the Chinese government promoted a significant regulation
campaign to eliminate over-capacity and outdated capacity in specific industries. These
staggered regulations provided a relatively exogenous shock on the loss of government
favored resources, which intuitively ensures that firms in these treated industries will face
severe financial constraints after the regulation shock.
The rationale behind the positive association between the reform of affected indus-
tries and the firm-level financial constraint can be understood from the following aspects.
First, given the cooling down of the over-heated sector, the financial condition of firms
that operate in these declining industries worsens as the profit margin of products and
services above a designated size significantly fell. Second, digesting the production gluts
of previously “favored” sectors is difficult for the government, which is caused by rapid
expansion with little regard for real market demand. These regulated firms’ sudden
loss of the “helping hand” from central and local governments corrected prior misalloca-
tions of scarce resources (such as banking credit). The cost wedge between internal and
external financing enlarges. Third, apart from the preceding misallocation of resources,
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firms in over-capacity and outdated industries are also often criticized for lower operating
efficiency and lower productivity of factors as these industries likely belong to the state-
dominant upstream sectors. Without further access to government preferential policy,
worsening financial difficulties build barriers to investment. Thus we expect a significant
increase in ICFS if the FHP’s interpretation is rightly recognized. This situation leads
to our first hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Firms in treated industries have greater investment-cash flow sensitivity
given the exogenous constraint caused by regulating over-capacity and outdated industries.
Hypothesis 1 notably links the strict regulations in some industries to the exogenous
deterioration in financial constraints. To differentiate the industry regulation effect, we
further examine whether and how the exogenous shock on firms’ financial constraint
varies across different firms.
Given that state ownership is an important institutional feature in China, previous
literature has recognized that SOEs constantly enjoy significant support through low
credit cost, land endowment, and some specific benefits from protected markets. Un-
der typical conditions, the preferential treatment to SOEs is a classic type of resource
misallocation (i.e., credit accessibility in Khwaja and Mian (2005) and Ai et al. (2017);
corporate bailouts in Faccio et al., 2006).
Treated (i.e. regulation policy-affected) firms will experience a sudden loss of the
“helping hand” from central and local governments and efficiency-based allocation of
scarce resource scheme emerges with the regulations enforced in specific industries. Thus,
compared with prior-regulation periods, SOEs lose more preferential treatment after the
industry policy adjustment than non-SOEs because non-SOEs have limited access to
these preferential privileges. Moreover, prior research has indicated that SOEs are al-
ways criticized for worse performance and weak balance sheets. That is, without access
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to the past government favor, we can intuitively posit that these SOEs suffer more from
financial constraints and their cost wedges between internal and external financing will
be relatively larger. This situation leads to our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: State-owned firms in treated industries have greater investment-cash flow
sensitivity than private firms given the exogenous constraint caused by regulating over-
capacity and outdated industries.
The following hypothesis further explores the impact of firms’ bank-dependency.
Owning to the sluggish development of the direct financing market in developing coun-
tries, especially in China, much attention has been devoted to the effect of accessibility of
this scarce resource. Credit rationing is a conventional market intervention tool for the
central government because of the supply shortage, and this tool fulfills their macroeco-
nomic objectives such as industrial policy. As required by the industry regulation policy,
for firms that operate in the over-capacity and outdated capacity industries, local banks
and financial institutions must deny the enterprises’ access to new loans, credit lines, and
other financial assistance.
Moreover, compared with firms that do not depend on banks, bank-dependent firms
are less incentivized to pursue other alternative financing sources prior to the regulation
shock. Under a similar level of shock, the wedge between internal cash and external
financing sources will become even larger for those bank-dependent firms. Thus, given
the guideline of industry policy adjustment over these out-of-favor firms, if the affected
firms have prior higher bank dependency, then the dramatic drop in the total amount of
borrowing from banks will significantly increase firms’ financial constraints. We expect
that bank-dependent firms will experience severely worsening financial constraints after
the government removes prior preferential treatment. We then have our third hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: Firms in treated industries have greater investment-cash flow sensitivity
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for bank- or credit-dependent firms given the exogenous constraint cased by regulating
over-capacity and outdated industries.
Lastly, as comprehensively discussed in the literature, the macroeconomic liquidity,
that is, the availability of cash in the economy, is one of the key factors that determines
the cost of external financing. Hypothesis 4 examines whether and how the exogenous
shock in financial constraints is related to macroeconomic variables. In November of 2008,
the Chinese government introduced an economic stimulus plan to mitigate the effects of
the global financial crisis. Two main components are proposed to increase the liquidity
of the entire market. The first component is the increase in government spending by
launching 4 trillion CNY stimulus packages on infrastructure projects and social welfare
enhancement activities. The second is the decrease of bank reserve requirements and
benchmark lending rates. Given this grand plan, the larger wedge between internal cash
and external financing triggered by the loss of political favoritism after the regulation
shock will be reduced during the stimulus period. Thus, we have our fourth hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4: Firms in treated industries increase less in investment-cash flow sensitiv-
ity during the credit expansion period from 2009 to 2010 given the exogenous constraint
caused by regulating over-capacity and outdated industries.
2.3 Data
2.3.1 Description of Sample and Dataset
Our sample includes all non-financial firms listed on the main board of Shanghai and
Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2006 to 2015. We drop financial firms because they are
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highly regulated, and their operating and investing activities are distinct from those of
other sectors. We start from 2006 to avoid the effects of the Split-share Structure Reform
on ICFS, which was initiated in 2005. We further exclude firms whose time of listing
is less than a year, as well as firms under special treatment (ST).9 Our entire sample
consists of 1,362 unique firms and 11,274 firm-year observations, of which 104 firms are
in the over- and outdated capacity lists and are affected by the industrial regulation. We
retrieve all variables from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR)
and WIND database. We winsorize observations at 1% and 99% for the main regression
variables to minimize the influence of outliers.
2.3.2 Variables and Summary Statistics
Table A1 in the appendix provides variable definitions. Investmenti,t is calculated
as firm i’s amount of capital expenditures in year t scaled by i’s beginning-of-period
net property, plant, and equipment. CFi,t represents cash flow, namely, earnings before
interest, tax, depreciation, and amortization for firm i in year t, deflated by beginning-
of-period net property, plant, and equipment. In addition, other main variables are
also scaled by beginning-of-period net property, plant, and equipment, for example, cash
holdings (Cash), revenues from main operating activities (Sale), bank loans (Loan),
and the amount of total external finance (the sum of loan, equity and bond) (External
F inance). We use Tobin’s Q to approximate for investment opportunities, and admit-
tedly, the approach suffers from measurement errors. However, in untabulated results,
our findings are robust to use alternative proxies for investment opportunities, namely,
market-to-book ratio and employment growth, and to use stock returns and growth rate
9Stocks in danger of being delisted are under ST in China, such as firms with negative net profits for
two consecutive years. The main results also hold if we include these firms in the sample.
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of sales as instruments. Table 2 tabulates summary statistics for the main variables used
in the analysis. The mean (median) pooled sample ratio of investment-capital ratio is
35.2% (17.7%). As a useful comparison, one can examine the rates in Chinese firms with
those of U.S. firms, despite the differences in the institutional environments of the two
countries. In Chen and Chen (2012), the average investment-capital ratio for manufac-
turing firms in the U.S. during 2002-2006 is 21.5%. In Hovakimian (2009), the ratio for
manufacturing firms during 1985-2004 is 27.3%. Both findings indicate that investment-
capital ratio in U.S. is lower than that in Chinese firms.
2.4 Empirical Findings
2.4.1 Baseline Results
Given that firms were regulated at different calendar times, we can apply a difference-
in-differences (DID) methodology to identify the effect of restriction to external finance
on ICFS, based on the enactment of the listed industries in Table 1. The treatment
group includes firms being regulated, whereas the control group includes firms never
being regulated. The treatment time differes in those regulated industries, thereby pro-
viding additional variations across time. We first estimate the following equation to test
Hypothesis 1 (H1):
Investmenti,j,w,t = α0 + β1CFi,j,w,t + β2Regulatedi,j,t + β3CFi,j,w,t ∗Regulatedi,j,t (1)
+ β4Qi,j,w,t−1 + β5Salei,j,w,t−1 + β6Cashi,j,w,t + αi + αj,t + αw,t + i,j,w,t
where the subscript i, j, t, and w denote for firm, industry, year (2006-2015), and
province, respectively. The dependent variable is investment over beginning-of-period
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net fixed capital. Regulatedi,t is the treatment dummy; that is, a dummy variable that
equals one if the company is in an industry that has been regulated in year t. The
interaction term CFi,j,w,t * Regulatedi,t (β3) measures the difference in ICFS after be-
ing regulated between treatment and control groups. In all specifications, I include firm
fixed effects (αi) to control for time-invariant firm characteristics omitted in regressions,
industry-by-year fixed effects (αj,t) for shocks to a certain industry at a specific year, and
province-by-year fixed effects (αw,t) for region-specific shocks at a given year.
10 Standard
errors are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. We omit sub-
scripts in the reminder of this paper for notational ease.
Based on prior research (e.g., Chen and Chen, 2012; FHP 1988), we also include other
control variables. Tobin’s Q (Q) is a proxy for investment opportunities, estimated as
market value over book value. Total sales (Sale) approximate for production, to con-
sider the accelerator effects. Including this variable is important because production
positively influences investment (Abel and Blanchard, 1986). We also include Cash be-
cause cash holdings and cash flow represent financial determinants of investment in a
more comprehensive way compared with only including cash flow. In addition, we use
the beginning-of-period values of Q and Sale to avoid reverse causality. β3 is the DID
estimator that measures the causal effects of the industrial regulation on ICFS, and H1
predicts that this result would be positive and significant.
Table 3 tabulates the estimation results in Equation (1). Column (1) shows the find-
ings based on the treatment group. Thus, β3 captures the pre- and post-average ICFS
after the firm has been regulated. The DID estimator is 0.079 and is significant at 1%
level. Thus, as firms are restricted with access to loans, they rely on internal funds to
finance investment expenditures after controlling for investment opportunities and op-
10Year fixed effects (αt) are absorbed by industry-by-year fixed effects, where αt controls for changing
macroeconomic conditions. The industry is based on the one-digit code in China Securities Regulatory
Commission. The note in Table A1 shows specific industrial classification.
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erational and financial determinants of investment. This finding is consistent with the
prediction that ICFS is an effective indicator for financial constraints, at least in devel-
oping countries.
In column (2), we expand observations to the main sample by including firms in the
treatment group, and those in the control group which are not in the same two-digit in-
dustry as the treatment group.11 By way of illustration, firms in electrolytic aluminium
(four-digit industrial code: 3316) are under regulation, and they belong to a broader cat-
egory: non-ferrous metal smelting and rolling processing industry (two-digit industrial
code: 33). In the control group, we also exclude firms in non-ferrous metal smelting
and rolling processing industry even if they are unregulated. This is because firms in
the same two-digit industry that may experience overlaps in primary business, and these
firms (code in 33 but not in 3316) may also be affected by the regulation. We exclude
these observations because they would confound the control group.12 The coefficient on
CF is 0.061 and significant at the 1% level, which implies that firm’s investment relies on
cash flow before being restricted by the industrial policy. However, β2 is -0.008, which is
small in magnitude and statistically insignificant, suggesting that regulated firms do not
reduce their investment expenditures after policy implementation. More importantly, the
DID estimator is similar in magnitude (7.6%) with column (1) and positively significant
at the 1% level. In untabulated results, we obtain more prominent effects for most of the
specifications when only including firms in the over-capacity industries.
In column (3), we further expand observations to the entire sample, including the
treatment group and all unregulated firms as the control group. The results are robust
to the alternative definition of the control group. Therefore, our findings are consistent
with H1, where firms in treated industries experience greater ICFS after the exogenous
11Unless otherwise noted, all estimations used in this paper are based on the main sample.
12The main results are robust and qualitatively similar when considering all the unregulated firms as
the control group.
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constraint. Although it is not the main focus of our paper, columns (2)-(3) also show
that coefficients on Q, Sale and Cash are positively significant, thereby indicating that
investment expenditures increase with better investment opportunities, higher produc-
tion, and increased cash holdings.
2.4.2 SOE and non-SOE firms
In the next set of regressions, we formally check the validation of Hypothesis 2 (H2).
The restriction of accessibility to loans makes the treated SOEs experience sudden losses
of the “helping hand” from central and local governments. Therefore, we would observe a
greater increase in ICFS for SOEs than non-SOEs. We test this hypothesis by separately
estimating Equation (1) for SOEs and non-SOE firms.13
Columns (1)-(2) of Table 4 show the regression analysis for H2.14 Both SOEs and
non-SOEs experience positively significant ICFS before the regulation and statistically
insignificant investment reduction afterwards. However, the DID effect is 0.189, signifi-
cant at 1% level for SOEs, whereas the coefficient is 0.036 for non-SOEs and is significant
at 5% level. More importantly, we could reject the null hypothesis that the DID effects
between these two types of firms are the same at 1% level. This result is consistent with
our prediction from H2.
Given that all regressions in Table 4 include calendar-year fixed effects (absorbed by
industry-by-year fixed effects), the coefficient on Regulated*CF can be interpreted as
the average effect of the industrial policy on ICFS. To investigate the dynamics of ICFS
and the effect of the regulation over time, we replace the Regulated dummy with a set of
13Following early literature, e.g., Liao et al. (2014), we define a firm as an SOE if its ultimate controller
is the state. Thus, non-SOE firms include private companies and mixed ownership structure but without
state controlled.
14We exclude firms changing state ownership during the sample period, i.e., from SOE to non-SOE or
from non-SOE to SOE. The results are quantitatively similar in maintaining these firms.
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six dummy variables that indicate the two years prior to the treatment (Regulated(−2),
Regulated(−1)); the year of the treatment (Regulated(0)); the first and second year after
the treatment (Regulated(1), Regulated(2), respectively); and three or more years after
the treatment (Regulated(3+)).15
As shown in columns (3)-(4), the coefficients of all pretreatment dummies that inter-
acted with cash flow are insignificant for SOEs and non-SOEs. This finding reassures that
no preexisting trend exists in the data. As shown by the positive and statistically signif-
icant coefficient of Regulated(0)*CF , the effect becomes prominent and significant for
both types of firms during the treatment year. Specifically, the ICFS of SOEs (non-SOEs)
increases by 50.2% (12.1%), significant at the 1% (5%) level. In addition, the coefficients
of Regulated(1)*CF , Regulated(2)*CF , and Regulated(3+)*CF remain large and sig-
nificant for SOEs, indicating that restricting access to loans has long-lasting effects on
ICFS for SOEs. However, for private companies, the effect is only marginally significant
one year after the treatment and remains insignificant for a longer period. This is also
in line with H2 because SOEs lost more preferential treatment after the regulation than
non-SOEs, as non-SOEs already have limited access to these preferential privileges before.
2.4.3 Further Tests on the Mechanism
Thus far, we contribute the increasing ICFS to the restricted accessibility to loans
after the policy. This seems plausible given the evidence of the industrial regulation.
However, potential issues could still arise, such as whether banks can strictly implement
the regulation on those restricted firms or whether local governments excessively inter-
vene, such that regulation implementation could be distorted. We conduct a formal test
15Earlier literature, (see e.g., Bertrand and Mullaianathan, 2003; Flammer and Kacperczyk, 2016) use
a similar specification to analyze the dynamics of the treatment effect under the DID methodology.
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to explicitly evaluate the mechanism by estimating the following equation:
Loani,w,t =α0 + β1Regulatedi,t + γXi,t + αi + αt + αw,t + i,w,t (2)
The dependent variable is loan, namely, cash obtained from bank loan deflated by
net property, plant, and equipment. X includes the following control variables, such
as Debt, Cash, and ROA (ratio of operating income to total assets). We also control
for firm (αi), year (αt), and province-by-year fixed effects (αw,t). Standard errors are
adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level.
In Panel A of Table 5, column (1) reports findings in Equation (2) using the main
sample. After controlling for other covariates that may affect loans, findings in column
(1) predict a statistically significant (at 5% level) decline in loans for regulated firms.
This is consistent with the notion that industrial regulation reduced the accessibility to
loans for firms in the treatment group.
Moreover, to the extent that SOEs and non-SOEs respond differently in ICFS, we
expect to see that loans are significantly reduced for SOEs following the enactment of the
industrial regulation compared with non-SOEs. Thus, we add a variable capturing the
interaction between Regulated and SOE, where SOE is a dummy variable that equals
one if the ultimate controller of a firm is the state or a government agency.16 The esti-
mated coefficient on this interaction term is the differential loan responses on these two
types of firms.
We present this estimation in column (1) of Panel B. The coefficient of Regulated
is 0.509, statistically insignificant at the conventional level, whereas the coefficient of
Regulated*SOE is -1.189, significant at 5% level. The economic magnitude is also sig-
nificant because the mean of the dependent variable is 4.05. These results indicate that
16Again, we exclude firms that change state ownership status during the sample period. The results
are also robust if those observations are not dropped.
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loans to SOEs are significantly reduced after the regulation, while the effect is positive
but statistically insignificant for private companies. This difference on how the regulation
affects loan amount is not unexpected given that SOEs were treated with preferential
terms before the regulation. The findings also support the view that it is the reduced
accessibility to loans that triggers the increase in ICFS, especially for SOEs.
However, a natural concern is whether the regulation affects other variables that are
uncorrelated with the accessibility to loan but also affects ICSF. If this is the case, an
increasing sensitivity could suffer from endogenous control. For example, if the policy
also affects cash flow and/or investment opportunities, then the increase of ICFS would
be explained by changes in the main control variables, instead of the restriction on loans.
Columns (2)-(3) of Panel A report estimation of Equation (2) with CF and Q as the
dependent variables, respectively. The finding shows a reduction of cash flow and in-
vestment opportunity after being regulated. However, the declines are not statistically
significant at the conventional level. Furthermore, we examine the endogenous control of
cash flow and Tobin’s Q for SOEs and non-SOE firms in columns (2)-(3) of Panel B. The
finding is reassuring because the coefficients of Regulated*SOE are statistically insignif-
icant, suggesting that the responses in ICFS for SOEs and non-SOEs are not explained
by differential changes in control variables.
Finally, we check the direct effect of regulation on investment expenditures because
the policy originally aims to restrict investment in those over-capacity and outdated ca-
pacity sectors. However, based on column (4) of both Panels A and Panel B, investment
in those regulated industries does not seem to decrease after the policy, and almost no
difference occurs between SOEs and non-SOE firms. However, identifying the types of
investment that those firms make after the regulation is difficult without further detailed
data. These regulated firms could invest in developing new techniques and adapting
advanced equipment to raise productivity. Conversely, in a worse scenario, although the
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accessibility to loan was restricted, the firms maintain similar investment levels by relying
more on internal funds.
2.5 Within-sample Comparison
2.5.1 Cross-sectional Heterogeneity
The estimates presented thus far suggest that ICFS increases as the ability to acquire
loans is restricted, and the effects are more profound for SOEs. These findings suggest
that ICFS is an effective indicator for financial constraints in China. If a reduction in
the availability of loan was indeed the reason for high ICFS, then we would expect that
it would be strongest for firms with the highest reliance on loans.
We evaluate Hypothesis 3 (H3) in this section. We use two proxies to measure the
dependence on loans, namely, (1) the fraction of loan to total external finance (Loan
ratio) and (2) cost of loan (Interest rate). For the first indicator, external finance is
consisted of loan, bond, and equity finance. A higher loan ratio reflects a firm’s greater
dependence on bank credits. For the second indicator, a lower interest rate implies less
expensive costs of loan, leading to higher dependence on bank credits. By using different
proxies, we aim to estimate whether credit-dependent firms experience a greater increase
in ICFS, as well as the extent to which the effect is robust across alternative measures.
Table 6 presents split-sample estimations for equation (1) based on indicators of
credit-dependence. We initially calculate the median level of the two variables for each
year, and firm i belongs to the high (low) group in year t if the value is above (below) the
median at t. Columns (1)-(2) report outcomes for high and low loan ratios. For firms
whose loan amounts consist of a high fraction of external finance, the lCFS increases by
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10.8% after the policy, significant at 1% level. However, the effect is economically small
and statistically insignificant for firms with below median loan. In addition, the results
are robust when loan ratio is calculated as loan amounts scaled by net fixed capital.
The next two columns show results for firms with above/below median interest rates.
As expected, the effects are only significant for firms with lower interest rates (7.8%, at
the 1% significant level), while the high interest rate group appears unaffected by the
regulation. Overall, the results are in line with our H3, suggesting that firms in treated
industries have higher increases in the ICFS for bank- or credit-dependent companies.
2.5.2 Effects Across Different Macro-economic Conditions
This part explores the potential heterogeneity across time series. If ICFS is a valid
measure of financial constraints, the effects of the industrial regulation should be ampli-
fied during the global financial crisis (2006-2008), because the crisis could lead to credit
crunch and exacerbate the difficulty of acquiring loans for regulated firms. Moreover,
according to Hypothesis 4 (H4), we also expect that the effect would be moderated dur-
ing the period of 4-trillion CNY economic stimulation plan by the Chinese government
(2009-2010), given that this stimulation plan is accompanied with credit boom, signif-
icant growth of loan issuance, and substantial liquidity injections to the market. To
examine this issue, we run regression for equation (1) based on different macro-economic
conditions.
Table 7 reports outcomes based on time series. Column (1) shows the effect of the
regulation during the financial crisis. As expected, when firms were restricted to ob-
tain loans between 2006 and 2008, the interaction term is greater in magnitude (25.5%
compared with 7.6% in column (2) of Table 3) and significant at 1% level. This implies
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that effects on ICFS are stronger when financial constraints are tighter in the general
economic condition. Column (2) reports the effect during 2009 and 2010. The DID
estimator is small in magnitude and statistically insignificant, suggesting that, firms in
regulated industries also benefit from the credit expansion during the stimulation plan.
We observe the pattern that capital flows back to less efficient sectors during this time
period.17 Finally, column (3) shows estimation analysis after 2011, when the influences
of crisis and stimulation have faded away. The DID coefficient is 0.061 and significant at
the 10% level, which reflects the effects of regulation without other compounding events.
In addition to the interaction term, the change of coefficients on CF is also consistent
with macro-economic conditions. During the credit crunch, the coefficient in column (1)
is 13.5% and significant at 1% level. As the investment plan expands credits, the coef-
ficient becomes statistically insignificant, thereby implying relaxed financial constraints.
When these effects fade away, the coefficient on CF remains positive and significant at
1% level (5.2%) in column (3). However, the magnitude is less than the case during the
financial crisis. Overall, the finding is consistent with H4.
2.6 Robustness Analysis
2.6.1 Propensity Score Matching
When we document changes in ICFS for regulated firms, we cannot know whether
the sensitivity would have increased even if these firms were not regulated. Thus, the
increasing sensitivity for the treatment group may suffer from selection bias because reg-
17Media reports also mention that part of the investment plan flows into those regulated industries,
such as iron and steel making. One of the disadvantages of the plan is to exacerbate the over-capacity
due to excessive government intervention.
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ulated firms are not randomly chosen. In the main results, we use the DID methodology
to address this concern and estimate the dynamics of ICFS. In the first robustness check,
we utilize the alternative method, propensity score matching, to confirm our findings.
Estimating equation (1) with the treatment group and its matched sample will correct
selection bias by accounting for the covariates that predict receiving the treatment.
To construct a sample of firms similar to the regulated firms, we match one-on-one
pairs for a treated firm with a firm that was never treated based on key financial vari-
ables one year prior to the regulation. These variables include the previous main variables
(Investment, Cash, CF , Sale, SOE, and Q), as well as the log of book value of assets
(lnSize) and the sum of short-term and long-term debt over book value (Debt ratio).18
We can find matched firms for 81 of the regulated firms and obtain 162 paired-sample
for the propensity score matching analysis.
Table A2 in the Appendix shows the matching results for the main variables. The
t-statistics for all normalized differences are not significant at the conventional level,
which suggests that, covariates are balanced across the treatment and control groups
within strata of the propensity score. Table 8 reports estimation results for propensity
score matching using caliper matching (0.01). Column (1) indicates only one year after
regulation of the paired-sample. Column (2) shows the outcomes for the rest of years
after regulation. Column (3) is similar to column (2) and additionally controls for un-
observed firm fixed effects. The coefficient of treatment effect on ICFS (Regulated*CF )
are positive and significantly at the 1% level in all three cases. This finding is reassur-
ing because it implies that the main findings are robust in the paired-sample when key
financial variables are balanced across the treatment and control groups.
18By way of illustration, if firm A was regulated in 2008, then we use A’s key variables in 2007 (one
year prior to the regulation) and match them with key variables in 2007 from firms in the control group
(never regulated).
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2.6.2 Alternative Definition of the Treatment Group
Thus far, in the main results, the treatment group is defined based on the four-digit
industrial code of the firm’s primary business. If that industry was in the regulation
list, then the firm within the same industry would be considered as treated. Here, we
provide an alternative definition for the treatment group. A firm could conduct busi-
ness belonging to different types of (four-digit) industries, and WIND database provides
detailed descriptions of all types of business in which each firm is involved. We then
count the number of times that a firm’s business belongs to regulated industries. We
create a dummy variable (Sdummy) that equals 1 if at least one of these industries is
regulated, and 0 otherwise.19 Column (1) of Table 9 reports the estimation results in
equation (1), and the only change is replacing Regulatedi,t with Sdummy. The coeffi-
cient of Sdummy*CF is 5.9%, significant at 1% level, thereby implying that the findings
are robust to this alternative definition of the treatment group.
2.6.3 Placebo Tests
Finally, we conduct three sets of placebo tests. The first one varies the regulation
time for the treatment group. We reestimate the regression in Table 3 with a pseudo
treatment time and results are reported in columns (2) of Table 9. We create modified
treatment times by allowing two years prior to the actual regulation time (Regulatedpre2).
For example, the regulation time for coal (electricity) industry was in 2009 (2010), and we
change it to 2007 (2008). As expected, the findings in column (2) show that the treatment
effect is small in magnitude and statistically insignificant for the pseudo timing. We ex-
plore the second test using the random assignment of treatment firms (Regulatedrandom).
19For instance, if a firm?s primary business is involved in making tires, nitrogenous fertilizer, and plate
glass, then it counts as Sdummy = 1 because plate glass is in that list.
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We randomly select firm-year observation to the treated and maintain the same number
of total regulated observations. We present the results for in column (3). The effects are
small in magnitude and insignificant at the conventional level. The third test replaces
the dependent variable (Investment) with another variable that is unlikely to be affected
by the regulation. For example, the dependent variable we choose is the receivable ratio,
namely, the total amount of account receivables over book value of assets. We expect
to see no effect when reestimating equation (1) with receivable ratio as the dependent
variable. Column (4) presents the outcomes. The results are in sharp contrast to those
in Table 3, and the estimates predict negligible effects. Overall, treatment effects do not
appear to persist based on the results of all three placebo tests.
2.7 Conclusions
This paper tests the extent to which ICFS measures financial constraints, which is a
controversial finding since 1997. We exploit the staggered industrial regulation in China,
which exogenously restricted the accessibility to loans for over- and backward production
capacity industries in the manufacturing sector. Using the DID methodology, we find
that a 7.6% significant increase in ICFS for treated industries after policy implementa-
tion, and the effects are more prominent in SOEs and more credit-dependent firms, and
smaller under credit expansion. We also reassure that the regulation affects the accessi-
bility to loan without confounding to other variables that are uncorrelated with financial
constraints but also affect ICFS. Finally, we provide robustness analysis by employing
propensity score matching, alternative definition of treatment industries, and a series of
placebo tests.
The staggered regulation tightened financial constraints for firms in those treated
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industries, but did not reduce the amount of investment expenditures in outdated- and
overcapacity sectors. Further research should focus on providing a rationalized explana-
tion, in particular, the types of investment that these firms make. This effect is not trivial
because this is not only a domestic issue in China, but also affects other economic entities
via exports and outward foreign direct investments. Moreover, future study should ex-
amine whether and how ICFS measures financial constraints differently in emerging and
developed markets. Doing so would greatly add to our understanding of the interaction
between investment and financing decisions across countries.
2.8 Tables
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Table 1: Time of Listing for Regulated Industries
Four-digit Code (2002 version) Industry Date of Listing Article
2520 Coking 10/2008 a
3199 Calcium carbide 10/2008 a
3240 Ferroalloy 10/2008 a
3111-3121 Cement manufacturing 10/2008 b
2210-2223 Paper making 12/2008 c
3141 Plate glass 12/2008 c
3210-3230 Ironmaking and steelmaking 12/2008 c
3316 Electrolytic aluminium 12/2008 c
0610-0690 Coal 09/2009 d
4419 Wind turbines1 09/2009 d
N/A Polysilicon2 09/2009 d
1461 Monosodium Glutamate(MSG) 11/2009 e
1469 Citric acid 11/2009 e
1510 Ethyl alcohol 11/2009 e
1711-1761 Dyeing and textile 04/2010 f
1910 Tanning 04/2010 f
2811-2829 Chemical fiber 04/2010 f
3311-3312 Copper, Lead, and Zinc smelting 04/2010 f
4411 Electricity 08/2010 g
3940 Lead storage battery 12/2011 h
3751-3752 Shipbuilding 07/2013 i
1, 2: Polysilicon and Wind Turbines were removed from this list in 2015.
We collect information based on official announcements from the MIIT, and only record the first time when
each industry was listed. All industries have outdated capacity, and in particular, the six ones in bold are
over-capacity industries.
Article (a) Eliminating Outdated Production Capacity in Calcium Carbide, Ferroalloy, and Coking Industries
(Lists of Enterprises)
Article (b) Eliminating Outdated Production Capacity in Cement Industry (Lists of Enterprises)
Article (c) Eliminating 1.065 million tons of Outdated Production Capacity in Paper-making Industry
Article (d) Several Opinions on Suppressing over-capacity in Some Industries (Forwarded from the State
Council)
Article (e) Notice on the Decomposition of Eliminating Outdated Production Capacity
Article (f) Notice on Further Strengthening the Work of Removing Outdated Capacity (Forwarded from the
State Council)
Article (g) Report on Task Accomplishments for the National Elimination of Outdated Production Capacity
Article (h) Issuing Objectives and Tasks for 19 Industrial Sectors on the Elimination of Outdated Production
Capacity
Article (i) Interpretation of Standard Conditions for the Shipping Industry
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Table 2: Summary statistics, 2006-2015
Mean SD 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
Investment 0.352 0.651 0.017 0.076 0.177 0.361 1.136
Cash flow (CF ) 1.169 3.306 -0.046 0.197 0.349 0.750 4.253
Loan 4.054 13.145 0.000 0.346 0.861 2.001 15.683
External finance 4.667 15.173 0.000 0.407 0.982 2.291 17.473
Q 1.565 1.420 0.309 0.641 1.127 1.958 4.427
Sale 7.301 16.284 0.516 1.330 2.702 5.931 25.684
Cash 2.537 7.590 0.070 0.242 0.597 1.562 9.633
SOE 0.678 0.467 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Debt ratio 0.519 0.190 0.187 0.384 0.531 0.662 0.815
ROA 0.042 0.053 -0.044 0.023 0.041 0.066 0.125
lnSize 22.188 1.338 20.272 21.283 22.030 22.960 24.622
Regulated 0.084 0.278 0 0 0 0 1
This table presents summary statistics for main regression variables. The sample consists of
11,274 firm-year observations and 1,362 unique firms from 2006 to 2015. Main variables are
winsorized at 1% and 99% to minimize the influence of outliers. Investment expenditure,
cash flow, loan, external finance, sale, and cash are deflated by the beginning-of-period net
fixed capital. Variable definitions are provided in the Appendix Table A1.
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Table 3: Effects of the Industrial Regulation
Dependent variable: Treatment Main Whole
Investment Group Sample Sample
CF 0.078 0.061*** 0.062***
(0.047) (0.012) (0.012)
Regulated 0.106* -0.008 -0.017
(0.059) (0.029) (0.028)
Regulated*CF 0.079*** 0.076*** 0.077***
(0.014) (0.027) (0.027)
Q 0.060** 0.060*** 0.060***
(0.025) (0.010) (0.009)
Sale 0.016 0.005** 0.005**
(0.010) (0.002) (0.002)
Cash -0.005 0.010*** 0.009**
(0.008) (0.004) (0.004)
Firm FE X X X
Year FE X X X
Industry-year FE X X X
Region-year FE X X
adjusted R2 0.476 0.178 0.173
No. of cases 1,021 10,107 11,274
The dependent variable is Investment and CF is cash flow. The
rest of results are estimated with the main sample, unless spec-
ified otherwise. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted
for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. *, **, ***
indicate significant level at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 4: SOEs and non-SOEs
Dependent Variable SOE non-SOE SOE non-SOE
Investment
CF 0.050*** 0.041** 0.050*** 0.042**
(0.014) (0.019) (0.014) (0.019)
Regulated -0.037 -0.049
(0.034) (0.068)
Regulated*CF 0.189*** 0.036**
(0.042) (0.018)
Regulated(−2) 0.043 -0.166*
(0.059) (0.097)
Regulated(−1) 0.029 -0.202*
(0.060) (0.117)
Regulated(0) -0.114* -0.147
(0.065) (0.125)
Regulated(1) 0.009 -0.203
(0.051) (0.127)
Regulated(2) 0.020 -0.189**
(0.060) (0.084)
Regulated(3+) 0.019 -0.151
(0.060) (0.098)
Regulated(−2)*CF 0.127 -0.010
(0.107) (0.016)
Regulated(−1)*CF 0.138 -0.007
(0.107) (0.022)
Regulated(0)*CF 0.502*** 0.121**
(0.053) (0.047)
Regulated(1)*CF 0.220*** 0.042*
(0.028) (0.021)
Regulated(2)*CF 0.113*** 0.032
(0.025) (0.020)
Regulated(3+)*CF 0.206* 0.022
(0.108) (0.030)
Control
variables X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Regional-year FE X X X X
Industry-year FE X X X X
adjusted R2 0.158 0.156 0.164 0.152
No. of cases 6,222 2,751 6,172 2,723
Control variables include Q, Sale, and Cash. Standard errors (in parenthe-
ses) are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. *,
**, and *** indicate significant level at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 5: Tests on the Mechanism
Panel A: Main Sample
Dependent variable: Loan Cash flow Q Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regulated -0.588** -0.048 -0.069 0.032
(0.288) (0.057) (0.134) (0.028)
Control
variables X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Region-year FE X X X X
adjusted R2 0.263 0.543 0.159 0.187
No. of cases 10,007 10,062 10,040 10,058
Panel B: SOEs and non-SOEs
Dependent variable: Loan Cash flow Q Investment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regulated 0.509 -0.442 -0.380 0.023
(0.529) (0.323) (0.256) (0.048)
Regulated*SOE -1.189** 0.333 0.351 -0.001
(0.564) (0.326) (0.263) (0.057)
Control
variables X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Region-year FE X X X X
adjusted R2 0.364 0.167 0.119 0.125
No. of cases 8,960 9,006 8,954 9,006
Control variables include Cash, CF , Sale, Debt, Q, and ROA (except the
dependent variable in each regression). Standard errors (in parentheses) are
adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. *, **, and ***
indicate significant level at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 6: Within-sample Comparison (Credit-dependence)
Dependent variable: High Low High Low
Investment Loan ratio Loan ratio Interest rate Interest rate
CF 0.058*** 0.082*** 0.067*** 0.053***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.021) (0.014)
Regulated -0.030 -0.003 -0.031 -0.007
(0.029) (0.068) (0.026) (0.054)
Regulated*CF 0.117*** 0.022 0.033 0.077**
(0.030) (0.022) (0.043) (0.030)
Control
variables X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Region-year FE X X X X
adjusted R2 0.187 0.238 0.177 0.195
No. of cases 5,993 4,143 5,311 4,825
Classifications of high and low are based on the median level in each year. Standard errors
(in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level. *, **,
and *** indicate significant level at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 7: Heterogenous Effects Across Different Macro-economic Conditions
Sample Period
Dependent variable: Financial Crisis four-trillion RMB Stimulus After 2011
Investment 2006-2008 2009-2010 2011-2015
CF 0.135*** 0.067 0.052***
(0.028) (0.046) (0.017)
Regulated -0.048 0.049 0.036
(0.047) (0.103) (0.089)
Regulated * CF 0.255*** -0.052 0.061*
(0.044) (0.080) (0.033)
Control
variables X X X
Firm FE X X X
Year FE X X X
Region-year FE X X X
Industry-year FE X X X
adjusted R2 0.240 0.101 0.202
No. of cases 2,822 1,957 5,328
Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm
level. *, **, and *** indicate significant level at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
Table 8: Propensity Score Matching
Dependent Variable: One-year after All years after All years after
Investment matching matching matching
CF 0.047 -0.052** -0.007
(0.122) (0.023) (0.023)
Regulated -0.203*** -0.110*** 0.004
(0.052) (0.038) (0.075)
Regulated*CF 0.610*** 0.226*** 0.131***
(0.190) (0.018) (0.030)
Control
variables X X X
Firm FE X
Year FE X X X
adjusted R2 0.549 0.544 0.316
No. of cases 160 1024 1024
The one-on-one paired match is between a treated and a never treated firm based
on their key financial variables one-year prior to the being regulated.*, **, and
*** indicate significant level at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 9: Placebo Tests
Dependent variable: Investment Investment Investment Receivable ratio
(1) (2) (3) (4)
CF 0.043*** 0.062*** 0.064*** 0.000
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.000)
SDummy*CF 0.059***
(0.019)
Regulatedpre2 -0.000
(0.032)
Regulatedpre2*CF 0.051
(0.033)
Regulatedrandom 0.016
(0.029)
Regulatedrandom*CF -0.012
(0.013)
Regulated 0.001
(0.004)
Regulated ∗ CF 0.001
(0.002)
Control
Variables X X X X
Firm FE X X X X
Year FE X X X X
Region-year FE X X X X
Industry-year FE X X X X
adjusted R2 0.178 0.176 0.171 0.083
No. of cases 10,205 10,136 10,256 11,307
Regulatedpre2 is a pseudo regulation time, namely, two years prior to the actual regulation time.
Regulatedrandom represents that firms receive random assignment of treatment. The dependent
variable in column (4), receivable ratio, is the total amount of account receivables over book value
of assets. Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at
the firm level. *, **, and *** indicate significant level at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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2.9 Appendix
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Table A2: Comparing Covariates for Matched Samples
Controlmean Treatmentmean Norm Difference t-statistic
Investment 0.319 0.276 -0.088 (-0.560)
CF 0.852 0.691 -0.055 (-0.350)
Q 1.937 1.718 -0.142 (-0.904)
Sale 3.301 6.245 0.121 (0.768)
Cash 2.592 1.454 -0.126 (-0.802)
lnSize 22.267 22.328 0.045 (0.286)
Debt ratio 0.508 0.533 0.160 (1.016)
SOE 0.790 0.765 -0.059 (-0.376)
No. of observation 81 81
*, **, and *** indicate significant level at the 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Chapter 3
Government Intervention and
Investment Efficiency: Evidence
from China’s Industrial Regulation
3.1 Introduction
Investment efficiency is one of the most important topics in corporate finance. In per-
fect capital markets, investment would only depend on a firm’s investment opportunities
measured by Tobin’s Q (Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Tobin, 1969). However, empirical
findings indicate that firms often deviate from the optimal investment strategy due to
frictions and cause inefficient investment. Literature has mainly discussed two sources
of these frictions in developed markets: agency problems and information asymmetry.
The former would create conflict between managers and shareholders, resulting in over-
investment; while the latter would increase the costs of external finance and result in
under-investment due to financial constraints (see e.g., Stein, 2003). However, following
Chen et al. (2011), this paper investigates the source of frictions through government
intervention and further explores its causal impacts on investment efficiency, which is
prevelant in emerging markets.
Although government intervention in corporate activities is common across the world,
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I explore the effect in China and use an industrial policy, “the elimination of over-capacity
and outdated capacity production”, as the exogenous shock to the reduction of govern-
ment intervention. This regulation makes staggered efforts to include various manufac-
turing sectors into the list at different time and gradually restrict control over the added
capacity. This is because prior to the reform, these companies received favorable policies
due to political considerations and they would hardly survive without it. I find the Chi-
nese setting is particularly interesting for two reasons. First, this industrial regulation
provides exogenous variation across both time and industries by removing previously
favored government interventions. This serves as an unique identification strategy and
largely mitigates the endogeneity concern. Second, it is easier to detect the effects of
government intervention in China because both local and central governments play an
essential role in corporate activities through state ownership, especially in state-owned
enterprises (SOEs). Besides ownership structure, the Chinese government also expands
its control by establishing political connections, e.g., appointing top executives, many of
whom are current or previous government officials (Pan and Tian, 2017). Thus, firms with
state ownership and/or political connections provide an opportunity to explore whether
and how government intervention affects firms’ investment behavior.
I hypothesize that government intervention would decrease investment efficiency, and
specifically, the effect is more prominent for SOEs. Previous studies have shown that
state ownership is an essential force in scare resource allocation and note that SOEs
often enjoy preferential treatment ( “soft-budget constraints”) from the government re-
gardless of their performance, such as lower cost of credit and land endowment (e.g.,
Gugler, 2003). This is because an important target of SOEs is to accomplish social and
political goals such as employment and regional economic growth. Thereby, the favored
government policy would lead to distortion of investment efficiency and result in misal-
location of resources (see e.g., Fan et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2011). I test the hypothesis
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by examining whether investment efficiency (measured as the sensitivity of investment
to Tobin’s Q) would increase for treated firms after the regulation since this policy ex-
ogenously reduced (or even reversed) government interventions. I further posit that the
increase in the investment-to-Tobin’s Q sensitivity is significant both economically and
statistically in SOEs because private companies tend to suffer less from the deprivation
of government intervention. Because non-SOEs did not usually have the “helping hand”
from the government priori to the reform. Using a difference-in-differences approach, I
examine the change of investment efficiency and find that empirical results are consistent
with my prediction.
I further measure government intervention by whether a firm has politically connec-
tions. Following Fan et al. (2007) and Chen et al. (2011), I classify a firm as politically
connected if its chairman or CEO is a current or former government officer. I predict
that for private firms, investment efficiency will be higher for politically connected com-
panies than non-politically connected ones in the treated industry given the exogenous
shock of government intervention. This is because non-SOEs with political connections
are usually the ones with more resources (e.g., access to profitable investment opportu-
nities), and this connection remains effective even after the regulation, thereby, leading
to higher investment efficiency. However, it is not the case for SOEs because political
connection does not provide additional benefits for investment efficiency given that SOEs
are already connected with the government through ownership. The empirical findings
are also consistent with my predictions.
This paper adds to the extant literature on the association of corporate investment
and government intervention. Many scholars have examined the interpretation of in-
vestment efficiency through agency problems and information asymmetry, which mainly
focusing on well-developed financial markets. However, since market structure is differ-
ent across countries, implications from the developed countries might not always hold
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in emerging markets. Therefore, this paper is among the first to explore the causal im-
pacts between government intervention on investment under the context of developing
countries. Given that government intervention is prevalent, this paper enriches our un-
derstanding of the efficiency of corporate investment. Furthermore, it also investigates
the link between political connections and corporate investment behavior, which provides
additional measurement of government intervention.
Moreover, the results also provide a novel perspective to examine the economic conse-
quences of an important industrial policy, the elimination of over-capacity and outdated
capacity in manufacturing sectors. This paper analyzes the direct effects on firms’ in-
vestment and also sheds light on the heterogeneous effects between SOE and non-SOEs,
and between firms with and without political connections. Furthermore, studying this
regulation would allow us to learn more about international trade related to China since
excessive production could lead to important global issues that affects other countries via
exports and outward foreign direct investments (Gao and Wang, 2017). However, many
studies so far have mainly focused on aggregated data, descriptive analysis, or capacity
measurement (see e.g., Shen and Chen, 2017). By contrast, it is among the first papers
that examines the industrial regulation with firm-level data.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the institutional background of
the regulation and develops hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data, variables, iden-
tification strategy and econometric model. Section 4 presents the main findings with a
difference-in-differences approach.
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3.2 Institutional Background and Hypotheses Devel-
opment
3.2.1 Institutional Background
Over-capacity and outdated capacity are important phenomena that emerged in cer-
tain manufacturing sectors in China. Over-capacity implies low capacity utilization. For
example, the production capacity of raw steel in 2012 was 72% in China and 78% in
the world. But, there were still on-going investments aiming to expand capacity of steel
making. Outdated capacity implies either inefficient production technology or produc-
tion causing pollution and high energy consumption.1
This is caused by economic stimulus plans enacted by the government of China,
providing a strongly irrational incentive for “hot money” flowing into those government-
targeted sectors.2 Therefore, the government intervention creates many “zombie firms”,
namely, firms that would go bankrupt due to poor performance but survive with external
support from governments or financial sector (Kane, 1987). Local governments support
these companies because they can support local economic growth, fiscal income, social
stability, and employment targets, which are essential performance indicators for govern-
ment officers’ promotion. Under such intervention, these sectors grow rapidly despite the
phenomena of over-capacity and outdated capacity.
Furthermore, over-capacity and outdated capacity are exacerbated by the support
from local banks. Regardless of the performance, banks still prefer to provide loans to
firms which are important to regional economy because they are “stable”, namely, these
1In particular, over-capacity industries mainly include ironmaking and steel making, coal, shipbuild-
ing, aluminum, concrete, and emerging sectors such as the photovoltaic and wind turbine, whereas
outdated capacity industries include not only these ones, but also other sectors, such as heavy chemical
industry and etc.
2For example, companies operating in the favored industries were equipped with grants, low-interest
loans, cheap energy and other raw materials, and even free land resources (Gao and Wang, 2017).
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firms are more likely to pay back debts due to the support from local governments. In
addition, the scope and severity of over- and outdated capacity further expanded given
the macroeconomic conditions, such as the slowdown of China’s economic growth and
the decreasing demand for exports. As a consequence, government interventions allow
low-efficiency manufacturing enterprises to enjoy preferential policies and regional pro-
tection, thereby causing inefficient resource allocation and crowding out the top-quality
enterprises.
Eliminating zombie firms is the main approach to reduce over-capacity and backward
production capacity. Therefore, zombie firms need to be deprived of those privileged
policies. Beginning from 2008, in order to curb excessive production capacity, the State
Council issued “Instructions on Tackling the Problem of Excess Over-capacity and Elim-
inations of Outdated Industries”. The Ministry of Industry and Information Technology
gradually restricted controls over the added capacity and included more industries to the
list of sectors based on four-digit industrial codes.3 Once an industry is being listed,
the regulators would restrain firms in that industry from obtaining previous preferential
policies.
In order to make sure the successful implementation, the central government in-
structed local governments to conduct policies accordingly. If companies do not comply,
e.g., still investing on projects that adding over-capacity and backward production ca-
pacity, local banks and financial institutions must deny the enterprises’ access to new
loans, lines of credit, and other financial assistance (Gao and Wang, 2017). Meanwhile,
local officers cannot approve additional requests for new land permits from noncompli-
ant enterprises (Shen and Chen, 2017). Furthermore, the government promotes market
competition and improves the exit mechanism for zombie firms. Therefore, the industrial
3See Table 1 in Gao and Wang (2017) for detailed information about the listing time and listing
industries.
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regulations provide an ideal setting for staggered shocks in government interventions.
In particular, the staggered industrial regulation provides a relatively exogenous shock
on the loss of favored government intervention, e.g., firms change from enjoying favored
policies to suffering from strict regulations.
3.2.2 Hypotheses Development
The Chinese economy is a hybrid of central planning and market-based activities,
where the government controls the key resources that are essential for companies (Pan
and Tian, 2017). In this sense, government intervention can shape the incentives and
operations of economic entities to a great extend. According to firms’ operating activi-
ties, the efficiency of corporate investment is a fundamental concern in corporate finance.
Empirically, a firm’s investment should be only determined by its investment opportunity
(Tobin, 1969). Nonetheless, researchers have identified a variety of frictions that could
distort investment efficiency. In particular, information asymmetry and agency problems
are two important distortional forces that have received most attention in the literature
(Stein, 2003; Chen et al., 2011).
In this section, I argue that government intervention is another source of friction caus-
ing suboptimal investment. In particular, I develop testable hypotheses, concerning the
causality of government intervention on investment efficiency by exploring the recent Chi-
nese industry regulation. As reviewed in the institutional background, China promoted
a regulatory campaign to eliminate over-capacity and outdated capacity in specific in-
dustries. After the reform, treated firms would have to rectify the distorted investment
efficiency in order to survive, leading to improved investment efficiency. Therefore, I
construct my first hypothesis:
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Hypothesis 1: After regulating over-capacity and outdated capacity industries, invest-
ment becomes more efficient for firms in treated industries given the exogenous shock of
government intervention.
The rationale behind the association between the reform of affected industries and
investment efficiency can be different between SOEs and non-SOEs. For SOEs, before
the regulation, government intervention would change the objective of SOEs to the pref-
erence of the government (such as employment and fiscal income), thereby leading to
misallocation and investment inefficiency. For example, given the soft budget constraint,
SOEs do not have incentives to improve the quality of investment as it may not be the
priority of the government. However, with the implementation of the regulation, the
treated SOEs suddenly lost the “helping hand” from governments. Thus, they have to
pursue for more efficient investment through improving production technology in order
to survive in the fierce market competition. However, for regulated non-SOEs, although
being negatively affected by the policy as well, they would not suffer as much loss as
the SOEs, because private companies had limited access to the preferential government
interventions during the pre-regulation period. Thus, I expect that the industrial regula-
tion will remove the valuable preferential treatment from SOEs, but not necessarily from
non-SOEs. I therefore construct the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: After regulating over-capacity and outdated capacity industries, com-
pared with private firms, investment becomes more efficient for state-owned firms in
treated industries given the exogenous shock of government intervention.
State ownership is not the only measure of government intervention because SOEs in
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China are not static and the establishment of state-owned holding companies and par-
tially privatized SOEs made government intervention more costly to realize. Therefore,
I further measure the degree of government intervention by whether their top executives
are politically connected. Following Fan et al. (2007), I classify a firm as politically
connected if its chairman, CEO, president, or vice president is a current or former gov-
ernment official.
According to Wu et al. (2012), I posit that the impact of political connection is
different for SOEs and non-SOEs. In particular, SOEs are already connected with the
government through government ownership. In this case, no matter whether a SOE
is politically connected or not, it does not provide additional benefits for investment
opportunity (Pan and Tian, 2017). On the other hand, private firms with political con-
nections are usually the ones with more profitable investment opportunities. A common
impression is that maintaining political connections is more important than operational
profitability in emerging markets, which is particularly important in China (Chen et al.,
2011). Because valuable investment projects are still controlled by the Chinese govern-
ment. Therefore, although all treated non-SOEs are affected by the industrial regulation,
the ones with political connections would be able to recover more easily and obtain more
profitable investment projects. This situation leads to our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3: After regulating over-capacity and outdated capacity industries, com-
pared with state-owned enterprises, investment becomes more efficient for politically con-
nected private firms relative to non-politically connected private firms in treated indus-
tries, given the exogenous shock of government intervention.
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3.3 Identification, Sample and Methodology
3.3.1 Identification of the influence of government intervention
The endogeneity issue of government intervention is the main concern for empirical
study. Ideally, I would apply a natural experiment that allows me to avoid the omitted
variable bias. Specifically, I collect a sample of regulated listed corporations, because the
timing of this staggered policy announcement is exogenous to these firms. I compare in-
vestment efficiency for event firms before and after the policy of eliminating over-capacity
production. Furthermore, different four-digit manufacturing sectors are regulated at dif-
ferent times, which allows me to explore the time-variation as well.
3.3.2 Sample and data
My sample includes all non-financial firms listed on the main board of Shanghai
and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2006 to 2015. Following Gao and Wang (2017), I
manually collect information about the time and which four-digit industry is regulated
through the official website of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. I
determine the nature of firm ownership by the ultimate controller from the annual re-
port.4 Information about political connection is collected from China Stock Market and
Accounting Research (CSMAR) database. I classify a firm as politically connected if
one of the top executives (i.e., the president, CEO, or vice president), is a current or a
previous government official. For case with ambiguous disclosure, I search Google and
WIND dataset as a cross-check. Other firm-specific financial variables are drawn from
the CSMAR database.
4A firms is classified as an SOE if its ultimate controller is the government, while a firm is considered
as a non-SOE when the ultimate controller is an individual or a non-state entity.
117
Government Intervention and Investment Efficiency: Evidence from China’s Industrial Regulation
Chapter 3
Following common practice, I drop financial firms because their operating and invest-
ing activities are distinct from other sectors. I also exclude firms whose time of listing
is less than a year. Furthermore, I winsorize observations at 1% and 99% for the main
regression variables to minimize the influence of outliers. My entire sample consists of
1,362 unique firms and 11,274 firm-year observations, of which 104 firms are in the over-
and outdated capacity lists and are affected by the regulation. Table 1 provides detailed
variable definitions.
Around two thirds of my sample firms are state-owned enterprises, and one third
of the firms are private companies. 15.2% of all listed firms are politically connected,
11.56% for SOEs, and 15.96% for non-SOEs. I use Tobin’s Q to approximate for in-
vestment opportunities. Admittedly, the approach suffers from measurement errors. In
untabulated results, my findings are robust to use alternative proxies for investment op-
portunities, namely, market-to-book ratio and employment growth. Table 2 tabulates
summary statistics for the main variables used in the analysis. The mean (median)
pooled sample ratio of investment-to-asset ratio is 4.8% (3.3%).
3.3.3 Methodology
Given that firms are regulated at different times, I apply a difference-in-differences
(DID) methodology to identify the effect of government intervention on investment ef-
ficiency based on the enactment of the listed industries (see Table 1 of Gao and Wang,
2017 for detailed information). The treatment group is considered as firms in regulated
industries, whereas the control group includes firms never being regulated. To study
the multivariate analysis of corporate investment efficiency, I follow the majority of in-
vestment literature by employing the sensitivity of investment expenditure to investment
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opportunities (Tobin’s Q) (e.g., Lang et al., 1996; Stein, 2003; Gertner et al., 2002; Hung
et al., 2007; Chen et al., 2011). Thus, I first estimate the following equation to test
Hypothesis 1 (H1):
Investmenti,t = β0 + β1Qi,t−1 + β2Regulatedi,t + β3Qi,t−1 ∗Regulatedi,t + β4CFOi,t−1
(1)
+ β5Levi,t−1 + β6logSizei,t−1 + β7SEOi,t−1 + αi + αi,t + i,t
where the subscript i and t denote for firm and year respectively. The dependent
variable is Investment, which is capital expenditures scaled by the beginning-of-period
total asset. Regulated is the treatment dummy; that is, a dummy variable that equals
one if a firm is in an industry that has been regulated in year t. Q represents invest-
ment opportunities, measured as the market value over book value of total assets. The
interaction term Q * Regulated (β3) is the DID estimator, measuring the difference in
investment efficiency after regulation between treatment and control groups. H1 predicts
that this coefficient would be positively significant. In all specifications, I also include
firm fixed effects (αi) to control for time-invariant firm characteristics omitted in regres-
sions and (one-digit) industry-by-year fixed effects for shocks to a industry-specific shock
at a given year (year fixed effects are therefore absorbed). Standard errors are adjusted
for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level.
Based on prior research (e.g., Richardson, 2006; Chen et al., 2011), I also include
other control variables. CFO is a firm’s cash flows from operating activities. I expect
a positive coefficient for this variable because higher cash flow provides more internal fi-
nance for investment. A firm with high leverage ratio (Lev) indicates a high debt finance
burden. Thus, I expect this coefficient to be negative. SEO represents cash proceeds
from seasoned equity offerings, controlling for another main source of external finance.
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All of the three variables are scaled by the beginning-of-period total assets. Moreover, I
also include the logarithm of total assets as an approximation for size, which could also
affect the level of investment. More importantly, I use the beginning-of-period values for
these variables to avoid reverse causality.
To test Hypothesis 2 (H2), I further explore the heterogeneous effects by regressing
on SOEs and non-SOEs respectively. Moreover, to examine the impact of government
interventions on firms with and without political connections, I use a modified version of
Equation (1) and introduce a triple-interaction term to test Hypothesis 3 (H3):
Investmenti,t = β0 + β1Qi,t−1 + β2Regulatedi,t + β3PCi,t + β4Regulatedi,t ∗ PCi,t ∗Qi,t−1
(2)
+ β5Qi,t−1 ∗Regulatedi,t + β6PCi,t ∗Qi,t−1 + β7PCi,t ∗Regulatedi,t + β8CFOi,t−1
+ β9Levi,t−1 + β10logSizei,t−1 + β11SEOi,t−1 + αi + Industry ∗ Y ear + i,t
PC is a dummy variable that equals one if a firm has political connections and zero
otherwise. β4 is the triple DID estimator, measuring the difference between investment
efficiency for treated firms with and without political connections after the regulation.
According to H3, β4 is expected to be positively significant in non-SOEs, while the sign
is uncertain for SOEs.
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3.4 Empirical Findings
3.4.1 Baseline Results
Table 3 presents the test results of H1, predicting that treated firms will exhibit higher
investment efficiency after being regulated. Column (1) shows the findings based on the
whole sample, including all firms in both manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors.
The coefficient on Regulated*Q captures the average investment efficiency after the firm
has been regulated, indicating a significantly higher investment efficiency. This DID es-
timator is 0.007 and is significant at 1% level. Thus, as firms are restricted with favored
government interventions, they have to increase investment efficiency to survive in the
market competition. The coefficient on Regulated is negatively significant, suggesting
that total investment declines after the regulation. Meanwhile, the coefficient on Tobin’s
Q is positively significant, which is consistent with the investment theory. With respect
to other control variables, the amount of investment expenditures is significantly smaller
when a firm has higher debt-to-asset ratio; and the amount is significantly larger when
a firm has a greater in size and/or using more equity finance. The effects of cash flow
from operating on investment is positive but not significant at the conventional level. In
column (2), I further include province-by-year fixed effects to control for province-level
shocks in a specific year and the coefficients are almost identical as in column (1), sug-
gesting that the effects are not explained by province-specific shocks.
In column (3), I restrict observations to the main sample by including firms in the
treatment group, and those in the control group but are not in the same two-digit in-
dustry as the treatment group. By way of illustration, firms in the plate glass industry
(four-digit code: 3141) are under regulation, and they belong to a broader category:
nonmetal mineral products industry (two-digit industrial code: 31). Therefore, in the
control group, I also exclude firms in the nonmetal mineral products industry even if
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they are not directly regulated. This is because firms in the same two-digit industry may
experience overlaps in primary business, and firms with code in 31 but not in 3141 may
be indirectly affected. I exclude them in case they would confound the control group.
However, the main results are still robust and qualitatively similar if considering all un-
regulated firms as the control group. Unless otherwise noted, all regressions are based
on the main sample. In this case, the DID estimator of the interaction term is 0.006,
still positively significant at the 5% level, which implies that the results are not sensitive
to different control groups. Therefore, my findings are consistent with H1, where firms
in treated industries experience significantly higher investment efficiency after the reform.
3.4.2 SOE and non-SOE firms
I formally check the validation of H2 in this section. Before the regulation, SOEs
have more privileged benefits from government intervention and are more likely to op-
erate with less efficiency under the “soft budget constraints”. However, the restricted
regulation makes the treated SOEs experience sudden losses of the “helping hand” from
central and local governments. Therefore, I expect to observe a greater increase in invest-
ment efficiency for SOEs than non-SOEs because they have incentives to correct resource
misallocation and pursue higher efficiency investment. However, since non-SOEs did not
enjoy much of these previous preferential treatments, their responses to the regulation
may not be as significant as SOEs.
I test this hypothesis by separately estimating Equation (1) for SOEs and non-SOE
firms and Table 4 shows regression analysis of H2. Because the state ownership status
changes across time, to avoid endogeneity, I exclude the ones that have changed owner-
ship status during the sample period, i.e., from SOE to non-SOE or from non-SOE to
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SOE.5 From the number of observations, we can infer that SOEs consist of two thirds of
the sample. In column (1), investment efficiency increases significantly for SOEs and the
DID estimator is 0.01 at the 5% significant level. However, for non-SOEs, investment
efficiency is higher (0.005) after the regulation but is not significant at the conventional
level. In addition, I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the DID estimator is quanti-
tatively the same between SOEs and non-SOEs. In summary, the results in Table 4 are
consistent with my prediction in H2.
3.4.3 Differential Impacts of Political Connections in SOEs ver-
sus non-SOEs
In Table 5, I examine H3, which is how political connections influence investment ef-
ficiency for SOEs versus non-SOEs. Because the nature of political connections between
these two groups is different, I analyze them separately. PC is the dummy variable to
differentiate connected and non-connected firms. In column (1), the coefficient of the
triple interaction term is negative but insignificant, suggesting that investment efficiency
is not higher for SOEs with political connections after the regulation. This is consistent
with my prediction in H3 because whether an SOE is politically connected or not, it
does not provide additional benefits for investment efficiency. The interpretation of β2 is
also important because it captures average investment efficiency for SOEs after the reg-
ulation, which is consistent with column (1) in Table 4. However, the triple interaction
term for non-SOEs is positively significant (0.014) at the 5% significant level, indicating
that non-SOEs with political connections experience a higher investment efficiency after
the regulation compared to the ones without connections. In addition, β2 is small in
5However, the results are quantitatively similar if I include these firms back.
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magnitude and insignificant, suggesting that most of the increasing investment efficiency
is driven by firms with political connections. The intuition is that private firms with
political connections are usually the ones with access to key investment projects and
resources, and the connection is still valuable after the regulation. Therefore, they are
more resourceful when cope with the unfavored regulation and increase the investment
efficiency during the post-reform period. According to the triple interaction terms in β3,
I argue that the results are consistent with H3.
3.5 Tables
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Table 2: Summary statistics (2006-2015)
Mean SD 5% 25% 50% 75% 95%
Invt 0.048 0.049 0.001 0.012 0.033 0.068 0.151
Qt−1 1.720 1.814 0.314 0.658 1.162 2.047 5.088
CFOt−1 0.077 0.072 -0.028 0.046 0.073 0.109 0.191
Levt−1 0.545 0.246 0.188 0.389 0.541 0.679 0.862
Sizet−1 22.046 1.434 19.976 21.111 21.930 22.871 24.562
SEOt−1 0.017 0.052 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.132
SOE 0.664 0.472 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Reg 0.087 0.282 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
PC 0.152 0.359 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000
This table presents summary statistics for main regression variables. The sam-
ple consists of 11,274 firm-year observations and 1,362 unique firms from 2006
to 2015. Main variables are winsorized at 1% and 99% to minimize the influ-
ence of outliers. Investment expenditure (Inv), cash flow (CFO), the sum of
short term and long term debt (Lev), and cash proceeds from seasoned equity
offerings (SEO) are deflated by the beginning-of-period total assets. Tobin’s Q
(Q) is the sum of market value of tradable shares, book value of non-tradable
shares and liabilities, divided by book value of total assets. SOE, Reg, and PC
are indicator variables for state-owned enterprises, firms in regulated industry,
and firms with political connections, respectively. Size is the logarithm ratio of
the beginning-of-period total assets. Variable definitions are provided in Table
1.
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Table 3: Effects of the Government Regulation on Investment Efficiency
Dependent variable: Whole Whole Main
Investment Sample Sample Sample
Regulated -0.015*** -0.015*** -0.013**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Regulated*Q 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.006**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Q 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
CFO 0.007 0.007 0.008
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Lev -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.010***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
lnSize 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SEO 0.055*** 0.055*** 0.061***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.010)
Firm FE X X X
Year FE X X X
Industry-year FE X X X
Region-year FE X
adjusted R2 0.073 0.080 0.075
No. of cases 12,354 12,354 11,026
The dependent variable is Investment. Columns (1) and (2)
are estimated for the whole sample. Column (3) includes the
only the main sample. The rest of results are estimated within
the main sample, unless specified otherwise. Standard errors (in
parentheses) are adjusted for heteroscedasticity and clustered at
the firm level. *, **, *** indicate significant level at the 10%,
5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 4: Heterogenous Effects on SOEs and non-SOEs
Dependent variable: SOE non-SOE
(1) (2)
Regulated -0.018** -0.013
(0.007) (0.010)
Regulated*Q 0.010** 0.005
(0.004) (0.006)
Q 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
CFO 0.007 -0.011
(0.015) (0.012)
Lev 0.003 -0.016***
(0.008) (0.005)
lnSize 0.009*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002)
SEO 0.069*** 0.040**
(0.013) (0.016)
Firm FE X X
Year FE X X
Industry-year FE X X
adjusted R2 0.093 0.062
No. of cases 6,573 3,144
Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level.
*, **, and *** indicate significant level at the
10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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Table 5: Heterogenous Effects on Political Connections
Dependent variable: SOE non-SOEs
Investment
Regulated -0.016** -0.008
(0.008) (0.007)
Regulated*Q 0.010** -0.001
(0.004) (0.003)
Regulated*Q*PC -0.010 0.014**
(0.009) (0.007)
Q*PC -0.002 0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Regulated*PC -0.004 -0.006
(0.012) (0.024)
Q 0.004*** 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001)
PC 0.008* 0.002
(0.005) (0.005)
CFO 0.008 -0.013
(0.015) (0.013)
Lev 0.004 -0.018***
(0.008) (0.005)
lnSize 0.008*** 0.006***
(0.002) (0.002)
SEO 0.070*** 0.040**
(0.014) (0.015)
Firm FE X X
Year FE X X
Industry-year FE X X
adjusted R2 0.094 0.069
No. of cases 6,526 3,077
Standard errors (in parentheses) are adjusted for
heteroscedasticity and clustered at the firm level.
*, **, and *** indicate significant level at the 10%,
5%, and 1%, respectively.
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